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Abstract
We study the problem of concealing functionality of a proprietary or private module when provenance
information is shown over repeated executions of a workflow which contains both public and private
modules. Our approach is to use provenance views to hide carefully chosen subsets of data over all
executions of the workflow to ensure Γ-privacy: for each private module and each input x, the module’s
output f (x) is indistinguishable from Γ− 1 other possible values given the visible data in the workflow
executions. We show that Γ-privacy cannot be achieved simply by combining solutions for individual
private modules; data hiding must also be propagated through public modules. We then examine how
much additional data must be hidden and when it is safe to stop propagating data hiding. The answer
depends strongly on the workflow topology as well as the behavior of public modules on the visible data.
In particular, for a class of workflows (which include the common tree and chain workflows), taking
private solutions for each private module, augmented with a public closure that is upstream-downstream
safe, ensures Γ-privacy. We define these notions formally and show that the restrictions are necessary.
We also study the related optimization problems of minimizing the amount of hidden data.
1 Introduction
Workflow provenance has been extensively studied, and is increasingly captured in workflow systems to en-
sure reproducibility, enable debugging, and verify the validity and reliability of results. However, as pointed
out in [16], there is a tension between provenance and privacy: Confidential intermediate data may be shown
(data privacy); the functionality of proprietary modules may become exposed by showing the input and out-
put values to that module over all executions of the workflow (module privacy); and the exact execution path
taken in a specification, hence details of the connections between data, may be revealed (structural privacy).
An increasing amount of attention is therefore being paid to specifying privacy concerns, and developing
techniques to guarantee that these concerns are addressed [30, 32, 7, 8].
This paper focuses on privacy of module functionality, in particular in the general – and common –
setting in which proprietary (private) modules are used in workflows which also contain non-proprietary
(public) modules, whose functionality is assumed to be known by users. There are proprietary modules
for tasks like gene sequencing, protein folding, medical diagnoses, that are commercially available and are
combined with other modules in a workflow for different biological or medical experiments [2, 1]. The
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functionality of these proprietary modules (i.e. what result will be output for a given input) is not known,
and owners of these proprietary modules would like to ensure that their functionality is not revealed when
the provenance information is published. In contrast for a public module (e.g. a reformatting or sorting
module), given an input to the module a user can construct the output even if the exact algorithm used by
the module is not known by users (e.g. Merge sort vs Quick sort).
Following [15], the approach we use is to extend the notion of ℓ-diversity [27] to the workflow setting by
carefully choosing a subset of intermediate input/output data to hide over all executions of the workflow so
that each private module is “Γ-private”: for every input x, the actual value of the output of the module, f (x),
is indistinguishable from Γ− 1 other possible values w.r.t. the visible data values in the provenance infor-
mation (in Section 6 we discuss ideas related to differential privacy). The complexity of the problem arises
from the fact that modules interact with each other through data flow defined by the workflow structure,
and therefore merely hiding subsets of inputs/outputs for private modules may not guarantee their privacy
when embedded in a workflow. We consider workflows with directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure, that
are commonly used in practice [3], contain common chain and tree workflows, and comprise a fundamental
yet non-trivial class of workflows for analyzing module privacy.
As an example, consider a private module m2, which we assume is non-constant. Clearly, when executed
in isolation as a standalone module, then either hiding all its inputs or hiding all its outputs over all execu-
tions guarantees privacy for any privacy parameter Γ. However, suppose m2 is embedded in a simple chain
workflow m1 −→ m2 −→ m3, where both m1 and m3 are public, equality modules. Then even if we hide
both the input and output of m2, their values can be retrieved from the input to m1 and the output from m3.
Note that the same problem would arise if m1 and m3 were invertible functions, e.g. reformatting modules,
a common case in practice.
In [15], we showed that in a workflow with only private modules (an all-private workflow) the problem
has a simple, elegant solution: If a set of hidden input/output data guarantees Γ-standalone-privacy for a
private module, then if the module is placed in an all-private workflow where a superset of that data is
hidden, then Γ-workflow-privacy is guaranteed for that module in the workflow. In other words, in an all-
private workflow, hiding the union of the corresponding hidden data of the individual modules guarantees
Γ-workflow-privacy for all of them. Clearly, as illustrated above, this does not hold when the private module
is placed in a workflow which contains public and private modules (a public/private workflow). In [15] we
therefore explored privatizing public modules, i.e. hiding the names of carefully selected public modules so
that their function is no longer known, and then hiding subsets of input/output data to ensure their Γ-privacy.
Returning to the example above, if it were no longer known that m1 was an equality module then hiding
the input to m2 (output of m1) would be sufficient. Similarly, if m3 was privatized then hiding the output of
m2 (input to m3) would be sufficient. It may appear that merging some public modules with preceding or
succeeding private modules may give a workflow with all private modules and then the methods from [15]
can be applied. However, merging may be difficulty for workflows with complex network structure, large
amount of data may be needed to be hidden, and more importantly, it may not be possible to merge at all
when the structure of the workflow is known.
Although privatization is a reasonable approach in some cases, there are many practical scenarios where
it cannot be employed. For instance, when the workflow specification (the module names and connections)
is already known to the users, or when the identity of the privatized public module can be discovered through
the structure of the workflow and the names or types of its inputs/outputs.
To overcome this problem, we propose an alternative novel solution, based on the propagation of data
hiding through public modules. Returning to our example, if the input to m2 were hidden then the input to
m1 would also be hidden, although the user would still know that m1 was the equality function. Similarly, if
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the output of m2 were hidden then the output of m3 would also be hidden; again, the user would still know
that m3 was the equality function. While in this example things appear to be simple, several technically
challenging issues must be addressed when employing such a propagation model in the general case: 1)
whether to propagate hiding upward (e.g. to m1) or downward (e.g. to m3); 2) how far to propagate data
hiding; and 3) which data of public modules must be hidden. Overall the goal is to guarantee that the
functionality of private modules is not revealed while minimizing the amount of hidden data.
In this paper we focus on downward propagation, for reasons that will be discussed in Section 3. Using
a downward propagation model, we show the following strong results: For a special class of common
workflows, single (private)-predecessor workflows, or simply single-predecessor workflows (which include
the common tree and chain workflows), taking solutions for Γ-standalone-privacy of each private module
(safe subsets) augmented with specially chosen input/output data of public modules in their public closure
(up to a successor private module) that is rendered upstream-downstream safe (UD-safe) by the data
hiding, and hiding the union of data in the augmented solutions for each private module will ensure Γ-
workflow privacy for all private modules. We define these notions formally in Section 3 and go on to show
that single-predecessor workflows is the largest class of workflows for which propagation of data hiding
only within the public closure suffices.
Since data may have different costs in terms of hiding, and there may be many different safe subsets
for private modules and UD-safe subsets for public modules, the next problem we address is finding a
minimum cost solution – the optimum view problem. Using the result from above, we show that for single-
predecessor workflows the optimum view problem may be solved by first identifying safe and UD-safe
subsets for the private and public modules, respectively, then assembling them together optimally. The
complexity of identifying safe subsets for a private module was studied in [15] and the problem was shown
to be NP-hard (EXP-time) in the number of module attributes. We show here that identifying UD-safe
subsets for public modules is of similar complexity: Even deciding whether a given subset is UD-safe for
a module is coNP-hard in the number of input/output data. We note however that this is not as negative
as it might appear, since the number of inputs/outputs of individual modules is not high; furthermore, the
computation may be performed as a pre-processing step with the cost being amortized over possibly many
uses of the module in different workflows. In particular we show that, given the computed subsets, for chain
and tree-shaped workflows, the optimum view problem has a polynomial time solution in the size of the
workflow and the maximum number of safe/UD-safe subsets for a private/public modules. Furthermore,
the algorithm can be applied to general single-predecessor workflows where the public closures have chain
or tree shapes. In contrast, when the public closure has an arbitrary DAG shape, the problem becomes
NP-hard (EXP-time) in the size of the public closure.
We then consider general acyclic workflows, and give a sufficient condition to ensure Γ-privacy that is not
the trivial solution of hiding all data in the workflow. In contrast to single-predecessor workflows, hiding
data within a public closure no longer suffices; data hiding must continue through other private modules
to the entire downstream workflow. In return, the requirement from data hiding for public modules is
somewhat weaker here: hiding must only ensure that the module is downstream-safe (D-safe), which
typically involves fewer input/output data than upstream-downstream-safety (UD-safe).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Our workflow model and notions of standalone-
and workflow-module privacy are given in Section 2. Section 3 describes our propagation model, defines
upstream-downstream-safety and single-predecessor workflows, and states the privacy theorem. Section 4.1
discusses the proof of the privacy theorem, and the necessity of the upstream-downstream-safety condi-
tion as well as the single-predecessor restriction. The optimization problem is studied in Section 4.2. We
then discuss general public/private workflows in Section 4.1, before giving related work in Section 6 and
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concluding in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
We start by reviewing the formal definitions and notions of module privacy from [15], and then extend them
to the context studied in this paper.1 Readers familiar with the definitions and results in [15] can move
directly to Section 3.
2.1 Modules, Workflows and Relations
Modules A module m with a set I of input data and a set O of (computed) output data is modeled as a
relation R. R has the set of attributes A = I∪O, and satisfies the functional dependency I → O. We assume
that I∩O = /0 and will refer to I and O as the input attributes and output attributes of R respectively.
We assume that the values of each attribute a ∈ A come from a finite but arbitrarily large domain ∆a, and
let Dom= ∏a∈I ∆a and CoDom= ∏a∈O ∆a denote the domain and co-domain of the module m respectively.2
The relation R thus represents the (possibly partial) function m : Dom→ CoDom and tuples in R describe ex-
ecutions of m, namely for every t ∈ R, ΠO(t) = m(ΠI(t)). We overload the standard notation for projection,
ΠA(R), and use it for a tuple t ∈ R. Thus ΠA(t), for a set A of attributes, denotes the projection of t to the
attributes in A.
Workflows A workflow W consists of a set of modules m1, · · · ,mn, connected as a DAG (see, for instance,
the workflow in Figure 1). We assume that (1) the output attributes of distinct modules are disjoint,
namely Oi ∩O j = /0, for i 6= j (i.e. each data item is produced by a unique module); and (2) whenever an
output of a module mi is fed as input to a module m j the corresponding output and input attributes of mi and
m j are the same. The DAG shape of the workflow guarantees that these requirements are not contradictory.
We model executions of W as a relation R over the set of attributes A = ∪ni=1Ai, satisfying the set of
functional dependencies F = {Ii → Oi : i ∈ [1,n]}. Each tuple in R describes an execution of the workflow
W . In particular, for every t ∈ R, and every i ∈ [1,n], ΠOi(t) = mi(ΠIi(t)). One can think of R as containing
(possibly a subset of) the join of the individual module relations.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows a workflow involving three modules m1,m2,m3 with boolean input and output
attributes implementing the following functions: (i) m1 computes a3 = a1∨a2, a4 =¬(a1∧a2) and a5 =
¬(a1⊕a2), where ⊕ denotes XOR; (ii) m2 computes a6=¬(a3+a4); and (iii) m3 computes a7=a4∧a6. The
relational representation (functionality) R1 of module m1 with the functional dependency a1a2 −→ a3a4a5
is shown in Figure 1a. For clarity, we have added I (input) and O (output) above the attribute names to
indicate their role. The relation R describing the workflow executions is shown in Figure 1b which has the
functional dependencies a1a2 −→ a3a4a5, a3a4 −→ a6, a4a5 −→ a7 from modules m1,m2,m3 respectively.
Data sharing refers to an output attribute of a module acting as input to more than one module (hence
Ii∩ I j 6= /0 for i 6= j). In the example above, attribute a4 is shared by both m2 and m3.
1The example in this section is also taken from [15].
2We distinguish between the possible range O of the function m that we call co-domain and the actual range {y : ∃x ∈ I s.t. y =
m(x)}
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I O
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
(a) R1: Functionality of m1
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
(b) R: Workflow executions
I \H O\H
a1 a3 a5
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
(c) R′=ΠA\H(R1)
Figure 1: Module and workflow executions as relations, and view
2.2 Module Privacy
We consider the privacy of a single module, which is called standalone module privacy, then privacy of
modules when they are connected in a workflow, which is called workflow module privacy. We study this
given two types of modules, private modules (the focus of [15]) and public modules (the focus here).
Standalone module privacy Our approach to ensuring standalone module privacy, for a module repre-
sented by the relation R, is to hide a carefully chosen subset H of R’s attributes (called hidden attributes). In
other words, we project R on a restricted subset A\H , where A is the set of all attributes of m. The set A\H
is called visible attributes. The users are allowed access only to the view R′ = ΠA\H(R).
One may distinguish two types of modules. (1) Public modules whose behavior is fully known to users.
Here users have a prior knowledge about the full content of R and, even if given only the view R′, they are
able to fully (and exactly) reconstruct R. Examples include reformatting or sorting modules. (2) Private
modules where such a priori knowledge does not exist. Here, the only information available to users, on the
module’s behavior, is the one given by R′. Examples include proprietary software, e.g. a genetic disorder
susceptibility module.
Given a view (projected relation) R′ of a private module m, the possible worlds of m are all the possible
full relations (over the same schema as R) that are consistent with the view R′. Formally,
Definition 1. Let m be a private module with a corresponding relation R, having input and output attributes
I and O respectively. Let A = I∪O be the set of all attributes. Given a set of hidden attributes H, the set of
possible worlds for R with respect to H, denoted Worlds(R,H), consists of all relations R′ over the same
schema as R that satisfy the functional dependency I → O, and where ΠA\H(R′) = ΠA\H(R).
To guarantee privacy of a module m, the view R′ should ensure some level of uncertainly with respect
to the value of the output m(ΠI(t)), for tuples t ∈ R. To define this, we introduce the notion of Γ-standalone-
privacy, for a given parameter Γ ≥ 1. Informally, a view R′ is Γ-standalone-private if for every t ∈ R,
Worlds(R,H) contains at least Γ distinct output values that could be the result of m(ΠI(t)).
Definition 2. Let m be a private module with a corresponding relation R having input and output attributes
I and O resp. Then m is Γ-standalone-private with respect to a set of hidden attributes H, if for every tuple
x ∈ ΠI(R), |OUTx,m,H | ≥ Γ, where OUTx,m,H = {y | ∃R′ ∈ Worlds(R,H), ∃t′ ∈ R′ s.t x = ΠI(t′)∧ y =
ΠO(t′)}.3
3In [15], we (equivalently) defined privacy with respect to visible attributes V instead of hidden attributes H, and we used the
notation “OUTx,m with respect to V ” instead of OUTx,m,H .
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If m is Γ-standalone-private with respect to hidden attributes H, then we call H a safe subset for m and
Γ.
A module cannot be differentiated from its possible worlds with respect to the visible attributes, and
therefore, whether the original module, or one from its possible worlds is being used cannot be recognized.
Hence, Γ-standalone-privacy implies that for any input the adversary cannot guess m’s output with proba-
bility > 1Γ , even if the module is executed an arbitrary number of times.
Example 2. Returning to module m1, suppose the hidden attributes are H = {a2,a4} resulting in the view
R′ in Figure 1c. For clarity, we have added I \H (visible input) and O\H (visible output) above the attribute
names to indicate their role. Naturally, R1 ∈ Worlds(R1,H), and we can check that overall there are 64
relations in Worlds(R1,H).
Furthermore, it can be verified that, if H = {a2,a4}, then for all x ∈ ΠI(R1), |OUTx,m1,H | ≥ 4, so
{a1,a3,a5} is safe for m1 and Γ = 4. As an example, when x = (0,0), OUTx,m,H ⊇ {(0,0,1), (0,1,1),
(1,0,0), (1,1,0)} (hidden attributes are underlined) – we can define four possible worlds that map (0,0)
to these outputs (see [15] for details). Also, hiding any two output attributes from O = {a3,a4,a5} en-
sures standalone privacy for Γ = 4, e.g. if H = {a2,a4}, then the input (0,0) can be mapped to one of
(0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,0) and (0,1,1); this holds for other assignments of input attributes as well. How-
ever, H = {a1,a2} (input attributes) is not safe for Γ = 4: for any input x, OUTx,m,H = {(0,1,1), (1,1,0),
(1,0,1)}, containing only three possible output tuples.
Workflow Module Privacy To define privacy in the context of a workflow, we first extend the notion of
possible worlds to a workflow view. Consider the view R′=ΠA\(R) of the relation R of a workflow W , where
A is the set of all attributes across all modules in W . Since W may contain private as well as public modules,
a possible world for R′ is a full relation that not only agrees with R′ on the content of the visible attributes
and satisfies the functional dependency, but is also consistent with respect to the expected behavior of the
public modules. In the following definitions, m1, · · · ,mn are the modules in W and F = {Ii→Oi : 1≤ i≤ n}
is the set of functional dependencies in R.
Definition 3. The set of possible worlds for the workflow relation R with respect to hidden attributes H
(denoted by
Worlds(R,H)) consists of all relations R′ over the same attributes as R that satisfy (1) the functional depen-
dencies in F, (2) ΠA\H(R′) = ΠA\H(R), and (3) ΠOi(t′) = mi(ΠIi(t′)) for every public module mi in W and
every tuple t′ ∈ R′.
We can now define the notion of Γ-workflow-privacy, for a given parameter Γ ≥ 1. Informally, a view
R′ is Γ-workflow-private if for every tuple t ∈ R, and every private module mi in the workflow, the possible
worlds Worlds(R,H) contain at least Γ distinct output values that could be the result of mi(ΠIi(t)).
Definition 4. A private module mi in W is Γ-workflow-private with respect to a set of hidden attributes H,
if for every tuple x ∈ ΠIi(R), |OUTx,W,H | ≥ Γ, where OUTx,W,H = {y | ∃R′ ∈ Worlds(R,H), s.t., ∀ t′ ∈ R′,
x = ΠIi(t′)⇒ y = ΠOi(t′)}.
W is called Γ-private if every private module mi in W is Γ-workflow-private. If W (resp. mi) is Γ-private
(Γ-workflow-private) with respect to H, then we call H a safe subset for Γ-privacy of W (Γ-workflow-privacy
of mi).
Similar to standalone module privacy, Γ-workflow-privacy ensures that for any input to a module mi, the
output cannot be guessed with probability ≥ 1Γ even if mi belongs to a workflow with arbitrary DAG structure
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and interacts with other modules with known or unknown functionality, and even the workflow is executed
an arbitrary number of times. For simplicity, the above definition assume that the privacy requirement
of every module mi is the same Γ. The results and proofs in this paper remain unchanged when different
modules mi have different privacy requirements Γi. Note that there is a subtle difference in workflow privacy
of a module defined as above and standalone-privacy (Definition 2); the former uses the logical implication
operator (⇒) for defining OUTx,W,H while the latter uses conjunction (∧) for defining OUTx,m,H . This is due
to the fact that some modules are not onto4; and as a result the input x itself may not appear in any execution
of the possible world R′. Nevertheless, there is an alternative definition of module mi that maps x to y and
can be used in the workflow for R′ consistently with the visible data.
2.3 Composability Theorem and Optimization
Given a workflow W and parameter Γ, there may be several incomparable (in terms of set inclusion) safe
subsets H for the (standalone) modules in W and for the workflow as a whole. Some of the corresponding
R′ views may be preferable to others, e.g. they provide users with more useful information, allow more
common/critical user queries to be answered, etc. If cost(H) denotes the penalty of hiding the attributes in
H , a natural goal is to choose a safe subset H that minimizes cost(H). A particular instance of the problem
is when the cost function is additive: each attribute a has some penalty value cost(a) and the penalty of
hiding H is cost(H) = Σa∈Hcost(a).
On the negative side, it was shown in [15] that the corresponding decision problem is hard in the number
of attributes, even for a single module and even in the presence of an oracle that tests whether a given
attribute subset is safe. On the positive side, however, it was shown that when the workflow consists only of
private modules (we call these “all-private” workflows), once privacy has been analyzed for the individual
modules, the results can be lifted to the whole workflow. In particular, the following theorem says that,
hiding the union of hidden attributes of standalone-private solutions of the individual modules in an all-
private workflow guarantees Γ-workflow-privacy for all of them.
Theorem 1. (Composability Theorem for All-private Workflows [15]) Let W be a workflow consisting
only of private modules m1, · · · ,mn. For each i ∈ [1,n], let Hi ⊆ Ai be a set of safe hidden attributes for Γ-
standalone-privacy of mi. Then the workflow W is Γ-private with respect to hidden attributes H =⋃ni=1 Hi.
It was also observed in [15] that the number of attributes of individual modules can be much smaller than
the total number of attributes in a workflow, and that a proprietary module may be used in many different
workflows. Therefore, the obvious brute-force algorithm, which is essentially the best possible, can be used
(possibly as a pre-processing step) to find all standalone-private solutions of individual modules. Then any
set of “local solutions” for each module can be composed to give a global feasible solution. Moreover,
the composability theorem ensure that the private solutions are valid even with respect to future workflow
executions which have not yet been recorded in the workflow relation.
Given Theorem 1, [15] focused on a modified optimization problem: combine standalone-private solu-
tions optimally to get a workflow-private solution. This optimization problem, which we refer to as optimal
composition problem, remains NP-hard even in the simplest scenario, and therefore, [15] proposed efficient
approximation algorithms.
4For a function f : D →C, D is the domain, C is the co-domain, and R = {y ∈C : ∃x ∈ D, f (x) = y} is the range. The function
f is onto if C = R.
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3 Privacy via propagation
Workflows with both public and private modules are harder to handle than workflows with all private mod-
ules. In particular, the composability theorem (Theorem 1) does not hold any more. To see why, we revisit
the example mentioned in the introduction.
Example 3. Consider a workflow with three modules m1,m2 and m3 as shown in Figure 2a. For simplicity,
assume that all modules have a boolean input and a boolean output, and implement the equality function
(i.e., a1 = a2 = a3 = a4). Module m2 is private, and the modules m1,m3 are public. When the private
module m2 is standalone, it can be verified that either hiding its input a2 or hiding its output a3 guarantees
Γ-standalone-privacy for Γ = 2. However, in the workflow, if a1 and a4 are visible then the actual values of
a2 and a3 can be found exactly since it is known that the public modules m1,m3 are equality modules.
One intuitive way to overcome this problem is to propagate the hiding of data through the problematic
public modules, i.e., to hide the attributes of public models that may disclose information about hidden at-
tributes of private modules. To continue with the above example, if we choose to hide input a2 (respectively,
output a3) to protect the privacy of module m2, then we propagate the hiding upstream (resp. downstream)
to the public modules and hide the input attribute a1 of m1 (respectively, the output attribute a4 of m3).
The workflow in the above example has a simple structure, and the functionality of its component mod-
ules is also simple. In general, three main issues arise when employing such a propagation model: (1)
upward vs. downward propagation; (2) repeated propagation; and (3) choosing which attributes to hide. We
discuss these issues next.
3.1 Upstream vs. Downstream propagation
Which form of propagation can be used depends on the safe subsets chosen for the private modules as well
as properties of the public modules. To see this, consider again Example 3, and assume now that public
module m1 computes some constant function (e.g., m1(0) = m1(1) = 0). If input attribute a2 for module
m2 is hidden, then using upward propagation to hide the input attribute a1 of m1 does not preserve the Γ-
workflow-privacy of m2 for Γ > 1. This is because it suffices to look at the (visible) output attribute a3 = 0
of m2 to know that m2(0) = 0. In general, upward propagation from a subset of input attributes which gives
Γ1-standalone-privacy for a private module m will only yield Γ2-workflow-privacy for m, where Γ1 ≥ Γ2. It
is possible that Γ1 >> Γ1 unless upstream public modules are onto functions; in the worst case, if upstream
modules are constant functions, then Γ2 = 1 whereas Γ1 can be arbitrarily large. Unfortunately, it is not
common for modules to be onto functions (e.g. some output values may be well-known to be non-existent).
In contrast, when the privacy of a private module is achieved by hiding output attributes only, using
downstream propagation it is possible to achieve the same privacy guarantee in the workflow as with the
standalone case without imposing any restrictions on the public modules. Observe that safe subsets of
output attributes always exist for all private modules – one can always hide all the output attributes. They
may incur higher cost than that of an optimal subset of both input and output attributes, but, in terms of
privacy, by hiding only output attributes one does not harm its maximum achievable privacy. In particular,
it is not hard to see that hiding all input attributes can give a maximum of Γ1-workflow-privacy, where Γ1
is the size of the range of the module. On the other hand hiding all output attributes can give a maximum
of Γ2-workflow-privacy, where Γ2 is the size of the co-domain of the module, which can be much larger
than the actual range. We therefore focus in the rest of this paper on safe subsets that contain only output
attributes.
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(b)
Figure 2: (a) Propagation model, (b) A single-predecessor workflow. White modules are public, grey are
private; the box denotes the composite module M for H2 = {a3}.
3.2 Repeated Propagation
Consider again Example 3, and assume now that public module m3 sends its output to another public module
m4 that implements an equality function (or a one-one invertible function). Even if the output of m3 is hidden
as described above, if the output of m4 remains visible, the privacy of m2 is again jeopardized since the output
of m3 can be inferred using the inverse function of m4. We thus need to propagate the attribute hiding to m4
as well. More generally, we need to propagate the attribute hiding repeatedly, through all adjacent public
modules, until we reach another private module.
To formally define the closure of public modules to which attributes hiding must be propagated, we use
the notion of a public path. Intuitively, there is a public path from a public module mi to a public module
m j if we can reach m j from mi by a path comprising only public modules. In what follows, we define both
directed and undirected public paths; recall that Ai = Ii∪Oi denotes the set of input and output attributes of
module mi.
Definition 5. A public module m1 has a directed (resp. an undirected) public path to a public module m2
if there is a sequence of public modules mi1 ,mi2 , · · · ,mi j such that mi1 = m1, mi j = m2, and for all 1≤ k < j,
Oik ∩ Iik+1 6= /0 (resp. Aik ∩Aik+1 6= /0).
This notion naturally extends to module attributes. We say that an input attribute a ∈ I1 of a public
module m1 has an (un)directed public path to a public module m2 (and also to any output attribute b ∈ O2),
if there is an (un)directed public path from m1 to m2. The set of public modules to which attribute hiding
will be propagated can now be defined as follows.
Definition 6. Given a private module mi and a set of hidden output attributes hi ⊆ Oi of mi, the public-
closure C(hi) of mi with respect to hi is the set of public modules reachable from some attribute in hi by an
undirected public path.
Example 4. We illustrate these notions using Figure 2b. The public module m4 has an undirected public path
to the public module m6 through the modules m7 and m3. For private module m2, if hidden output attributes
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h2 = {a2}, {a3}, or {a2,a3}, the public closure C(h2)= {m3,m4,m6,m7}. For h2 = {a4}, C(h2)= {m5,m8}.
In our subsequent analysis, it will be convenient to view the public-closure as a virtual composite module
that encapsulates the sub-workflow and behaves like it. For instance, the box in Figure 2b denotes the
composite module M representing C({a2}), that has input attributes a2,a3, and output attributes a10,a11
and a12.
3.3 Selection of hidden attributes
In Example 3, it is fairly easy to see which attributes of m1 or m3 need to be hidden to preserve the privacy
of m2. For the general case, where the public modules are not as simple as equality functions, to determine
which attributes of a given public module need to be hidden we use the notions of upstream and downstream
safety. To define them we use the following notion of tuple equivalence with respect to a given set of hidden
attributes. Recall that A denotes the set of all attributes in the workflow; we also use bold-faced letters x,y,z,
etc. to denote tuples in the workflow or module relations with one or more attributes.
Definition 7. Given two tuples x and y on a subset of attributes B ⊆ A, and a subset of hidden attributes
H ⊆ A, we say that x ≡H y iff ΠB\H(x) = ΠB\H(y).
Definition 8. Given a subset of hidden attributes H ⊆ Ai of a public module mi, mi is called
• downstream-safe (or, D-safe in short) with respect to H if for any two equivalent input tuples
x,x′ to mi with respect to H, their outputs are also equivalent:
[
x≡H x
′
]
⇒
[
mi(x)≡H mi(x
′)
]
,
• upstream-safe (or, U-safe in short) with respect to H if for any two equivalent outputs y,y′ of
mi with respect to H, all of their preimages are also equivalent:
[
(y ≡H y′)∧ (mi(x) = y,mi(x′) = y′)
]
⇒
[
x≡H x
′
]
,
• upstream-downstream-safe (or, UD-safe in short) with respect to H if it is both U-safe
and D-safe.
Note that if H = A (i.e. all attributes are hidden) then mi is clearly UD-safe with respect to to H . We
call this the trivial UD-safe subset for mi.
Example 5. Figure 3 shows some example module relations. For an (identity) module having relation R1 in
Figure 3a, the hidden subsets {a1,a3} and {a2,a4} are UD-safe. Note that H = {a1,a4} is not a UD-safe
subset: for tuples having the same values of visible attribute a2, say 0, the values of a3 are not the same.
For a module having relation R2 in Figure 3b, a UD-safe hidden subset is {a2}, but there is no UD-safe
subset that does not include a2. It can also be checked that the module m1 in Figure 1a does not have any
non-trivial UD-safe subset.
The first question we attempt to answer is whether there is a composability theorem analogous to Theo-
rem 1 that works in the presence of public modules. In particular, we will show that for a class of workflows
called single-predecessor workflows one can construct a private solution for the whole workflow by taking
safe standalone solutions for the private modules, and then ensuring the UD-safe properties of the public
modules in the corresponding public-closure. Next we define this class of workflows:
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a1 a2 a3 a4
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
(a) R1
a1 a2 a3 a4
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1
(b) R2
Figure 3: UD-safe solutions for modules
Definition 9. A workflow W is called a single-predecessor workflow, if
1. W has no data-sharing, i.e. for mi 6= m j, Ii∩ I j = /0, and,
2. for every public module m j that belongs to a public-closure with respect to some output attribute(s)
of a private module mi, mi is the only private module that has a directed public path to m j (i.e. mi is
the single private predecessor of m j).
Example 6. Again consider Figure 2b which shows a single-predecessor workflow. Modules m3,m4, m6,m7
have undirected public paths from a2 ∈ O2 (output attribute of m2), whereas m5,m8 have an undirected
(also directed) public path from a4 ∈ O2; also m1 is the single private-predecessor of m3, ...,m8 that has a
directed path to each of module. The public module m1 does not have any private predecessor, but m1 does
not belong to the public-closure with respect to the output attributes of any private module.
Although single-predecessor workflows are more restrictive than general workflows, the above example
illustrates that they can still capture fairly intricate workflow structures, and more importantly, they can
capture commonly found chain and tree workflows [3]. Next in Section 4, we focus on single-predecessor
workflows; then we explain in Section 5 how general workflows can be handled.
4 Single-Predecessor Workflows
The main motivation behind the study of single-predecessor workflows is to obtain a composability theorem
similar to Theorem 1 combining solutions of standalone private and public modules. In Section 4.1, we
show that such a composability theorem indeed exists for this class of workflows. Then we study how to
optimally compose the standalone solutions in Section 4.2.
4.1 Composability Theorem for Privacy
The following composability theorem says that, for each private module mi, it suffices to (i) find a safe
hidden subset of output attributes (downstream propagation), (ii) find a superset of these hidden attributes
such that each public module in their public closure is UD-safe, and (iii) no attributes outside the public
closure and mi are hidden (i.e. no unnecessary hiding). Then union of these subsets of hidden attributes is
workflow-private for each private module in the workflow. Theorem 2 stated below formalizes these three
conditions.
Theorem 2. (Composability Theorem for Single-predecessor Workflows) Let W be a single-predecessor
workflow. For each private module mi in W, let Hi be a subset of hidden attributes such that (i) hi = Hi∩Oi
is safe for Γ-standalone-privacy of mi, (ii) each public module m j in the public-closure C(hi) is UD-safe
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with respect to A j ∩Hi, and (iii) Hi ⊆ Oi ∪⋃ j:m j∈C(hi) A j. Then the workflow W is Γ-private with respect
to H =
⋃
i:mi is private Hi.
First, in Section 4.1.1, we argue why the conditions and assumptions in the above theorem are necessary;
then we prove the theorem in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Necessity of the Assumptions in Theorem 2
Theorem 2 has two non-trivial conditions: (1) the workflows are single-predecessor workflows, and (2) the
public modules in the public closure must be UD-safewith respect to the hidden subset; the third condition
that there is no unnecessary data hiding is required since the property UD-safety of public modules is not
valid with respect to set inclusion. The necessity of the first two conditions are discussed in Propositions 1
and 2 respectively.
In the proof of these propositions we will consider the different possible worlds of the workflow view
and focus on the behavior (input-to-output mapping) m̂i of the module mi as seen in these worlds. This may
be different than its true behavior recorded in the actual workflow relation R, and we will say that mi is
redefined as m̂i in the given world. Note that mi and m̂i, viewed as relations, agree on the visible attributes
of the the view but may differ in the non visible ones.
Necessity of Single-Predecessor Workflows The next proposition shows that single-predecessor work-
flows constitute ithe largest class of workflows for which a composability theorem involving both public and
private modules can succeed.
Proposition 1. There is a workflow W, which is not a single-predecessor workflow, and a private module
mi in W, where even hiding all output attributes of mi and all attributes of all the public modules in W does
not give Γ-privacy for any Γ > 1.
Proof. By Definition 9, a workflow W is not a single-predecessor workflow if one of the following holds: (i)
there is a public module m j in W that belongs to a public-closure of a private module mi but has no directed
path from mi, or, (ii) such a public module m j has a directed path from more than one private module, or
(iii) W has data sharing. We now show an example for condition (i). Examples for the remaining conditions
can be found in Appendix A.1.
Consider the workflow Wa in Figure 4a. Here the public module m2 belongs to the public-closure
C({a3}) of m1, but there is no directed public path from m1 to m2, thereby violating the condition of single-
predecessor workflows (though there is no data sharing). Module functionality is as follows: (i) m1 takes a1
as input and produces a3 = m1(a1) = a1. (ii) m2 takes a2 as input and produces a4 = m2(a2) = a2. (iii) m3
takes a3,a4 as input and produces a5 = m3(a3,a4) = a3 ∨ a4 (OR). (iv) m4 takes a5 as input and produces
a6 = m4(a5) = a5. All attributes take values in {0,1}.
Clearly, hiding output {a3} of m1 gives 2-standalone privacy. We claim that hiding all output attributes
of m1 and all attributes of all public modules (i.e. {a2,a3,a4,a5}) gives only trivial 1-workflow-privacy
for m1, although it satisfies the UD-safe condition of m2,m3. To see this, consider the relation Ra of all
executions of Wa given in Table 1, where the hidden values are in Grey. The rows (tuples) here are numbered
r1, . . . ,r4 for later reference.
When a3 is hidden, a possible candidate output of input a1 = 0 to m1 is 1. So we need to have a possible
world where m1 is redefined as m̂1(0) = 1. This would restrict a3 to 1 whenever a1 = 0. But note that
whenever a3 = 1, a5 = 1, irrespective of the value of a4 (m3 is an OR function).
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a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
r1 0 0 0 0 0 0
r2 0 1 0 1 1 1
r3 1 0 1 0 1 1
r4 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1: Relation Ra for workflow Wa given in Figure 4a
(a) Workflow Wa (b) Workflow Wb
Figure 4: Necessity of the conditions in Theorem 2: (a) Single-predecessor workflows, (b) UD-safety for
public modules; White modules are public, grey are private.
This affects the rows r1 and r2 in R. Both these rows must have a5 = 1, however r1 has a6 = 0, and r2
has a6 = 1. But this is impossible since, whatever the new definition m̂4 of private module m4 is, it cannot
map a5 to both 0 and 1; m̂4 must be a function and maintain the functional dependency a5 → a6. Hence all
possible worlds of Ra must map m̂1(0) to 0, and therefore Γ = 1.
Necessity of UD-safety for public modules Example 3 in the previous section motivated why the
downward-safety condition is necessary and natural. The following proposition illustrates the need for
the additional upward-safety condition in Theorem 2, even when we consider downstream-propagation.
Proposition 2. There is a workflow W with a private module mi, and a safe subset of hidden attributes hi
guaranteeing Γ-standalone-privacy for mi (Γ> 1), such that satisfying only the downstream-safety condition
for the public modules in C(hi) does not give Γ-workflow-privacy for mi for any Γ > 1.
Proof. Consider the chain workflow Wb given in Figure 4b with three modules m1,m2,m3 defined as follows.
(i) (a3,a4) = m1(a1,a2) where a3 = a1 and a4 = a2, (ii) a5 = m2(a3,a4) = a3∨a4 (OR), (iii) a6 = m3(a5) =
a5. m1,m3 are private whereas m2 is public. All attributes take values in {0,1}. Clearly hiding output a3
of m1 gives Γ-standalone privacy for Γ = 2. Now suppose a3 is hidden in the workflow. Since m2 is public
(known to be OR function), a5 must be hidden (downstream-safety condition). Otherwise from visible
output a5 and input a4, some values of hidden input a3 can be uniquely determined (eg. if a5 = 0,a4 = 0,
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then a3 = 0 and if a5 = 1,a4 = 0, then a3 = 1). On attributes (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6), the original relation R is
shown in Table 2 (the hidden attributes and their values are underlined in the text and in grey in the table).
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2: Relation R for workflow given in Figure 4b
Let us first consider an input (0,0) to m1. When a3 is hidden, a possible candidate output y of input tuple
x = (0,0) to m1 is (1,0). So we need to have a possible world where m1 is redefined as m̂1(0,0) = (1,0).
To be consistent on the visible attributes, this forces us to redefine m3 to m̂3 where m̂3(1) = 0; otherwise
the row (0,0,0,0,0,0) in R changes to (0,0,1,0,1,1). This in turn forces us to define m̂1(1,0) = (0,0) and
m̂3(0) = 1. (This is because if we map m̂1(1,0) to any of {(1,0),(0,1),(1,1)}, either we have inconsistency
on the visible attribute a4, or a5 = 1, and m̂3(1) = 0, which gives a contradiction on the visible attribute
a6 = 1.)
Now consider the input (1,1) to m1. For the sake of consistency on the visible attribute a3, m̂1(1,1)
can take value (1,1) or (0,1). But if m̂1(1,1) = (1,1) or (0,1), we have an inconsistency on the visible
attribute a6. For this input in the original relation R, a5 = a6 = 1. Due to the redefinition of m̂3(1) = 0, we
have inconsistency on a6. But note that the downstream-safety condition has been satisfied so far by hiding
a3 and a5. To have consistency on the visible attribute a6 in the row (1,1,1,1,1,1), we must have a5 = 0
(since m̂3(0) = 1). The pre-image of a5 = 0 is a3 = 0,a4 = 0, hence we have to redefine m̂1(1,1) = (0,0).
But (0,0) is not equivalent to original m1(1,1) = (1,1) with respect to the visible attribute a4. So the only
solution in this case for Γ > 1, assuming that we do not hide output a6 of private module m3, is to hide a4,
which makes the public module m2 both upstream and downstream-safe.
This example also suggests that upstream-safety is needed only when a private module gets input from a
module in the public-closure. We will see later the proof of Lemma 1 (Section 4.1.2) that this is indeed the
case.
4.1.2 Proof of Composability Theorem
To prove Γ-privacy, we need to show the existence of at least Γ possible outputs for each input to each private
module, originating from the possible worlds of the workflow relation with respect to the visible attributes.
First we present a crucial lemma, which shows the existence of many possible outputs for any fixed input to
any fixed private module in the workflow, when the conditions in Theorem 2 are satisfied. In particular, this
lemma shows that any candidate output for a given input for standalone privacy remains a candidate output
for workflow-privacy, even when the private module interacts with other private and public module in a
(single-predecessor) workflow. Therefore, if there are ≥ Γ candidate outputs for standalone-privacy, there
will be ≥ Γ candidate outputs for workflow-privacy. Later in this section we will formally prove Theorem 2
using this lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider a standalone private module mi, a set of hidden attributes hi, any input x to mi, and any
candidate output y∈ OUTx,mi,hi of x. Then y∈ OUTx,W,Hi when mi belongs to a single-predecessor workflow
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Figure 5: Illustration of Example 7: Input-output relationship in (a) original workflow, (b) possible world
mapping x to y.
W, and a set attributes Hi ⊆ A is hidden such that (i) hi ⊆Hi, (ii) only output attributes from Oi are included
in hi (i.e. hi ⊆Oi), and (iii) every module m j in the public-closure C(hi) is UD-safewith respect to A j∩Hi.
To prove the lemma, we will (arbitrarily) fix a private module mi, an input x to mi, a hidden subset hi,
and a candidate output y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi for x. The proof comprises two steps:
(Step-1) Consider the connected subgraph C(hi) as a single composite public module M, or equivalently as-
sume that C(hi) contains a single public module. By the properties of single-predecessor workflows,
M gets all its inputs from mi, but can send its outputs to one, multiple, or zero (for final output) private
modules. Let I (respectively O) be the input (respectively output) attribute sets of M. In Figure 2b, the
box is M, I = {a2,a3} and O = {a10,a11,a12,a13}. We argue that when M is UD-safe with respect
to visible attributes (I∪O)∩Hi, and the other conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied, then y∈OUTx,W,Hi .
(Step-2) We show that if every public module in the composite module M = C(hi) is UD-safe, then M is
UD-safe. To continue with our example, in Figure 2b, assuming that m3, m4, m6, m7 are UD-safe
with respect to the hidden attributes, we have to show that M is UD-safe.
Proof of Step-1. The proof of Lemma 1 is involved even for the restricted scenario in Step-1, in which
C(hi) contains a single public module. Due to space constraints, the proof is given in Appendix A.2, and we
illustrate here the key ideas using a simple example of a chain workflow.
Example 7. Consider a chain workflow, for instance, the one given in Figure 4b with the relation in Table 2.
Fix module mi = m1. Hiding its output h1 = {a3} gives Γ-standalone-privacy for Γ = 2. Fix input x = (0,0),
with original output z = m1(x) = (0,0) (hidden attribute a3 is underlined). Also fix a candidate output
y = (1,0) ∈ OUTx,m1,h1 . Note that y and z are equivalent on the visible attribute {a4}.
First, consider the simpler case when m3 does not exist, i.e. W contains only two modules m1,m2, and
the column for a6 does not exist in Table 2. As we mentioned before, when the composite public module
does not have any private successor, we only need the downstream-safety property for modules in C(hi); in
this case, C(hi) comprises a single public module, m2. We construct a possible world R′ of R by redefining
module m1 to m̂1 as follows: m̂1 simply maps all pre-images of y to z, and all pre-images of z to y. In this
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a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
Table 3: Relation R′, a possible world of the relation R for the workflow in Figure 4b with respect to H1 =
{a3,a4,a5}.
case, both y,z have single pre-image. So x = (0,0) gets mapped to (1,0) and input (1,0) gets mapped to
(0,0). To make m2 downstream-private, we hide output a5 of m2. Therefore, the set of hidden attributes
H1 = {a3,a5}. Finally R′ is formed by the join of relations for m̂1 and m2. Note that the projection of R,R′,
will be the same on visible attributes a1,a2,a4 (in R′, the first row will be (0,0,1,0,0) and the third row will
be (1,0,0,0,0)).
Next consider the more complicated case, when the modules in C(hi) have private successors (in this
example, when the private module m3 is present). We already argued in the proof of Proposition 2 that we
also need to hide the input a4 to ensure workflow privacy for Γ > 1 (UD-safety). Let us now describe the
proof strategy when a4 is hidden, i.e. H1 = {a3,a4,a5}.
Let wy = m2(y) and wz = m2(z) (see Figure 5a). We redefine m1 to m̂1 as follows (see Figure 5b). For all
input u to m1 such that u ∈m−11 m
−1
2 (wz) (respectively u ∈m−11 m−12 (wy)), we define m̂1(u) = y (respectively
m̂1(u) = z). Note that the mapping of tuples u that are not necessarily m−11 (y) or m−11 (z) are being redefined
under m1 (see Figure 5b). For m̂3, we define, m̂3(wy) = m3(wz) and m̂3(wz) = m3(wy). Recall that y ≡H1 z
(y,z have the same values of visible attributes). Since m2 is downstream-safe wy ≡H1 wz. Since m2 is also
upstream-safe, for all input u to m1 that are being redefined by m̂1, their images under m1 are equivalent with
respect to H1 (and therefore with y and z). In our example, wy = m2(1,0) = (1), and wz = m3(0,0) = (0).
m−11 m
−1
2 (wz) = {(0,0)} and m
−1
1 m
−1
2 (wy) = {(0,1), (1,0), (1,1)}. So m̂1 maps (0,0) to (1,0) and all of
{(0,1), (1,0), (1,1)} to (0,0); m̂3 maps (0) to (1) and 1 to (0).
Consider the relation R′ formed by joining the relations of m̂1, m2, m̂3 (see Table 3). The relation R′ has
the same projection on visible attributes {a1,a2,a6} as R in Table 2, and the public module m2 is unchanged.
So R′ is a possible world of R that maps x = (0,0) to y = (1,0) as desired, i.e. y ∈ OUTx,W,H1 . ✷
The argument for more general single-predecessor workflows, like the one given in Figure 2b, is more
complex. Here a private module (like m11) can get inputs from mi (in Figure 2b, m2), from its public-closure
C(hi) (in the figure, m8), and also from the private successors of the modules in C(hi) (in the figure, m10).
In this case, the tuples wy,wz are not well-defined, and redefining the private modules is more complex. In
the proof of the lemma we give the formal argument using an extended flipping function, that selectively
changes part of inputs and outputs of the private module based on their connection with the private module
mi considered in the lemma.
Proof of Step-2. The following lemma formalizes the claim in Step-2:
Lemma 2. Let M be a composite module consisting only of public modules. Let H be a subset of hidden
attributes such that every public module m j in M is UD-safe with respect to A j∩H. Then M is UD-safe
with respect to (I∪O)∩H.
Sketch. The formal proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A.3. We sketch here the main ideas. To
prove the lemma, we show that if every module in the public-closure is downstream-safe (respectively
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upstream-safe), then M is downstream-safe (respectively upstream-safe). For downstream-safety, we con-
sider the modules in M in topological order, say mi1 , · · · ,mik (in Figure 2b, k = 4 and the modules in order
may be m3,m6,m4,m7). Let M j be the (partial) composite public module formed by the union of modules
mi1 , · · · ,mi j , and let I j,O j be its input and output (the attributes that are either from a module not in M j to a
module in M j, or to a module not in M j from a module in M j. Clearly, M1 = {mi1} and Mk = M. Then by
induction from j = 1 to k, we show that M j is downstream-safe with respect to (I j ∪O j)∩H if all of miℓ ,
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ j are downstream-safe with respect to (Iiℓ ∪Oiℓ)∩H = Aiℓ ∩H . For upstream-safety, we consider
the modules in reverse topological order, mik , · · · ,mi1 , and give a similar argument by an induction on j = k
down to 1.
Proof of Theorem 2 Now we complete the proof of Theorem 2 using Lemma 1.
of Theorem 2. We first argue that if Hi satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2 then H ′i =
⋃
ℓ:mℓ is private Hℓ
satisfies the conditions in Lemma 1. Since hi = Hi∩Oi, (i) hi ⊆Hi ⊆
⋃
ℓ:mℓ is private Hℓ = H
′
i ; and (ii) hi ⊆Oi.
Next we argue that the third requirement in the lemma, (iii) every module m j in the public-closure C(hi) is
UD-safe with respect to H ′i ∩A j, also holds.
To see (iii), observe that the Theorem 2 has an additional condition on Hi: Hi ⊆Oi∪⋃ j:m j∈C(hi) A j. Since
W is a single-predecessor workflow, for two private modules mi,mℓ, the public closures C(hi)∩C(hℓ) = /0
(this follows directly from the definition of single-predecessor workflows). Further, since W is single-
predecessor, W has no data-sharing by definition. So for any two modules m j,mℓ in W (public or private),
the set of attributes A j∩Aℓ = /0. Clearly, when mi is a private module, mi /∈C(hℓ) for any private module mℓ
in W , by the definition of public-closure. Hence for any two private modules mi,mℓ,
Oi∪ ⋃
j:m j∈C(hi)
A j

∩

Oℓ∪ ⋃
j:m j∈C(hℓ)
A j

= /0.
In particular, for two private modules mi 6= mℓ, Hi∩Hℓ = /0. Hence, for a public module m j ∈C(hi), and for
any other private module mℓ, A j ∩Hℓ = /0. Therefore, A j ∩H ′i = A j ∩ (
⋃
ℓ:mℓ is private Hℓ) = A j \Hi. Since m j
is UD-safe with respect to A j ∩Hi from the condition in the theorem, m j is also UD-safe with respect
to A j ∩H ′i . This shows that H ′i satisfies the conditions stated in the lemma.
Theorem 2 also states that each private module mi is Γ-standalone-private with respect to hi, i.e.,
|OUTx,mi,hi | ≥ Γ for all input x to mi (see Definition 2). From Lemma 1, using H ′i in place of Hi, this implies
that for all input x to private modules mi, |OUTx,W,H′i | ≥ Γ where H
′
i =
⋃
ℓ:mℓ is private Hℓ. From Definition 4,
this implies that each private module mi is Γ-workflow-private H ′i which is the same as H in Theorem 2.
Since this is true for all private module mi in W , W is Γ-private with respect to H .
4.2 Optimal Composition for Single Predecessor Workflows
Recall the optimal composition problem mentioned in Section 2.3. This problem focused on optimally
combining the safe solutions for private modules in an all-private workflow in order to minimize the cost of
hidden attributes. In this section, we consider optimal composition for a single-predecessor workflow W
with private and public modules. Our goal is to find subsets Hi for each private module mi in W satisfying
the conditions given in Theorem 2 such that cost(H) is minimized for H =
⋃
i:mi is private Hi. This we solve
in four steps: (I) find the safe solutions for standalone-privacy for individual private modules; (II) find the
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UD-safe solutions for individual public modules; (III) find the optimal hidden subset Hi for the public-
closure of every private module mi using the outputs of the first two steps; and (IV) combine Hi-s to find the
final optimal solution H . We next consider each of these steps.
I. Private Solutions for Individual Private Modules For each private module mi we compute the set of
safe subsets Si = {Si1, · · · ,Sipi}, where each Siℓ ⊆ Oi is standalone-private for mi. Here pi is the number
of safe subsets for mi. Recall from Theorem 2 that the choice of safe subset for mi determines its public-
closure (and consequently the possible Hi sets and the cost of the overall solution). It is thus not sufficient
to consider only the safe subsets that have the minimum cost; we need to keep all safe subsets for mi, to be
examined by subsequent steps.
The complexity of finding safe subsets for individual private modules has been thoroughly studied in
[15] under the name standalone Secure-View problem. It was shown that deciding whether a given
hidden subset of attributes is safe for a private module is NP-hard in the number of attributes of the module.
It was further shown that the set of all safe subsets for the module can be computed in time exponential in
the number of attributes assuming constant domain size, which almost matches the lower bounds.
Although the lower and upper bounds are somewhat disappointing, as argued in [15], the number of
attributes of an individual module is fairly small. The assumption of constant domain is reasonable for
practical purposes, assuming that the integers and reals are represented in a fixed number of bits. In these
cases the individual relations can be big, however this computation can be done only once as a pre-processing
step and the cost can be amortized over possibly many uses of the module in different workflows. Expert
knowledge (from the module designer) can also be used to help find the safe subsets.
II. Safe Solutions for Individual Public Modules This step focuses on finding the set of all UD-safe
solutions for the individual public modules. We denote the UD-safe solutions for a public module m j
by U j = {U j1, · · · ,U jp j}, where each UD-safe subset U jℓ ⊆ A j, and p j denotes the number of UD-safe
solutions for the public module m j. We will see below in Theorem 3 that even deciding whether a given
subset is UD-safe for a module is coNP-hard in the number of attributes (and that the set of all such subsets
can be computed in exponential time). However, as argued in the first step, this computation can be done
once as a pre-processing step with its cost amortized over possibly many workflows where the module is
used. In addition, it suffices to compute the UD-safe subsets for only those public modules that belong to
some public-closure for some private module.
Theorem 3. Given public module m j with k attributes, and a subset of hidden attributes H, deciding whether
m j is UD-safe with respect to H is coNP-hard in k. Further, all UD-safe subsets can be found in EXP-
time in k.
Sketch of NP-hardness. The reduction is from the UNSAT problem, where given n variables x1, · · · ,xn, and
a 3NF formula f (x1, · · · ,xn), the goal is to check whether f is not satisfiable. In our construction, mi has
n+ 1 inputs x1, · · · ,xn and y, and the output is z = mi(x1, · · · ,xn,y) = f (x1, · · · ,xn)∨ y (OR). The set of
hidden attributes is x1, · · · ,xn (i.e. y,z are visible). We claim that f is not satisfiable if and only if mi is
UD-safe with respect to H .
The same construction in the NP-hardness proof, with attributes y and z assigned cost zero and all other
attributes assigned some higher constant cost, can be used to show that testing whether a safe subset with
cost smaller than a given threshold exists is also coNP-hard.
Regarding the upper bound, the trivial algorithm of going over all 2k subsets h of A j, and checking if h
is UD-safe for m j, can be done in EXP-time in k when the domain size is constant. Since the UD-safe
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property is not monotone with respect to further deletion of attributes, if h is UD-safe, its supersets may
not be UD-safe. Recall however that the trivial solution h=A j (deleting all attributes) is always UD-safe
for m j. So for practical purposes, when the public-closure for a private module involves a small number of
attributes of the public modules in the closure, or if the attributes of those public modules have small cost,
this solution can be used. The complete proof of the theorem is given in Appendix B.1.
III. Optimal Hi for Each Private Module The third step aims to find a set Hi of hidden attributes, of
minimum cost, for every private module mi. As per the theorem statement, this set Hi should satisfy the
conditions: (a) Hi∩Oi = Siℓ, for some safe subset Siℓ ∈ Si; (b) for every public module m j in the closure
C(Siℓ), there exists a UD-safe subset U jq ∈ U j such that U jq = A j ∩Hi; and (c) Hi does not include any
attribute outside Oi and C(Siℓ).
We show that, for the important class of chain and tree workflows, this optimization problem is solvable
in time polynomial in the number of modules n, the total number of attributes in the workflow |A|, and the
maximum number of sets in Si and U j (denoted by L = maxi∈[1,n] pi):
Theorem 4. For each private module mi in a tree workflow (and therefore, in a chain workflow), the optimal
subset Hi can be found in polynomial time in n, |A| and L.
On the other hand, the problem is NP-hard when the workflow has arbitrary DAG structure even when
both the number of attributes and the number of safe and UD-safe subsets of the individual modules are
bounded by a small constant.
In contrast, the problem becomes NP-hard in n when the public-closure forms an arbitrary directed
acyclic subgraph, even when L is a constant and the number of attributes of the individual modules is
bounded by a small constant.
Chain workflows are the simplest class of tree-shaped workflow, hence clearly any algorithm for trees
will also work for chains. However, for the sake of simplicity, we give the optimal algorithm for chain
workflows first; then we discuss how it can be proved for tree workflows.
Optimal algorithm for chain workflows. Consider any private module mi. Given a safe subset Siℓ ∈ Si,
we show below how an optimal subset Hi in C(Siℓ) satisfying the desired properties can be obtained. We
then repeat this process for all safe subsets (bounded by L) Siℓ ∈ Si, and output the subset Hi with minimum
cost. We drop the subscripts to simplify the notation (i.e. use S for Siℓ, C for C(Siℓ), and H for Hi).
Our poly-time algorithm employs dynamic programming to find the optimal H . First note that since C
is the public-closure of output attributes for a chain workflow, C should be a chain itself. Let the modules in
C be renumbered as m1, · · · ,mk in order. Now we solve the problem by dynamic programming as follows.
Let Q be an k×L two-dimensional array, where Q[ j, ℓ] denotes the cost of minimum cost hidden subset H jℓ
that satisfies the UD-safe condition for all public modules m1 to m j and A j∩H jℓ =U jℓ ∈U j. Here j ≤ k,
ℓ≤ p j ≤ L, and A j is the attribute set of m j; the actual solution can be stored easily by standard argument.
The initialization step is , for 1 ≤ ℓ≤ p1,
Q[1, ℓ] = c(U1,ℓ) if U1,ℓ ⊇ S
= ∞ otherwise
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Recall that for a chain, O j−1 = I j, for j = 2 to k. Then for j = 2 to k, ℓ= 1 to p j,
Q[ j, ℓ] = ∞ if there is no 1 ≤ q≤ p j−1
such that U j−1,q∩O j−1 =U j,ℓ∩ I j
= c(O j ∩U jℓ)+minq Q[ j−1,q]
where the minimum is taken over all such q
It is interesting to note that such a q always exists for at least one ℓ ≤ p j: while defining UD-safe
subsets in Definition 8, we discussed that any public module m j is UD-safewhen its entire attribute set A j
is hidden. Hence A j−1 ∈U j−1 and A j ∈U j, which will make the equality check true (for a chain O j−1 = I j).
In Appendix B.2 we show that shows that Q[ j, ℓ] correctly stores the desired value. Then the optimal solu-
tion H has cost min1≤ℓ≤pk Q[k, ℓ]; the corresponding solution H can be found by standard procedure, which
proves Theorem 4 for chain workflows.
Observe that, more generally, the algorithm may also be used for non-chain workflows, if the public-
closures of the safe subsets for private modules have chain shape. This observation also applies to the
following discussion on tree workflows.
Optimal algorithm for tree workflows. Now consider tree-shaped workflows, where every module in
the workflow has at most one immediate predecessor (for all modules mi, if Ii∩O j 6= /0 and Ii∩Ok 6= /0, then
j = k), but a module can have one or more immediate successors.
The treatment of tree-shaped workflows is similar to what we have seen for chains. Observe that, here
again, since C is the public-closure of output attributes for a tree-shaped workflow, C will be a collection of
trees all rooted at mi. As for the case of chains, the processing of the public closure is based on dynamic-
programming. The key difference is that the modules in the tree are processed bottom up (rather than top
down as in what we have seen above) to handle branching. The proof of Theorem 4 for tree workflows is
given in Appendix B.3.
NP-hardness for public-closure of arbitrary shape. Finding the minimal-cost solution for public-
closure with arbitrary DAG shape is NP-hard. We give a reduction from 3SAT (see Appendix B.4). The NP
algorithm simply guesses a set of attributes and checks whether it forms a legal solution and has cost lower
than the given bound; a corresponding EXP-time algorithm that iterates over all subsets can be used to find
the optimal solution.
The NP-completeness here is in n, the number of modules in the public closure. We note, however, that
in practice the number of public modules that process the output on an individual private module is small. So
the obtained solution to the optimum-view problem is still better than the naive one, which is exponential
in the size of the full workflow.
IV. Optimal Hidden Subset H for the Workflow According to Theorem 2, H = ⋃i:mi is private Hi is a
Γ-private solution for the workflow. Observe that finding the optimal (minimum cost) such solution H
for single-predecessor workflows is straightforward, once the minimum cost Hi-s are found: Due to the
condition in Theorem 2 that no unnecessary data are hidden, it can be easily checked that for any two private
modules mi,mk in a single predecessor workflow, Hi∩Hk = /0. This implies that the optimal solution H can
be obtained taking the union of the optimal hidden subsets Hi for individual private modules obtained in the
previous step.
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5 General Workflows
The previous sections focused on single-predecessor workflows. In particular, we presented a privacy the-
orem for such workflows and studied optimization with respect to this theorem. The following two obser-
vations highlight how this privacy theorem can be extended to general workflows. For lack of space the
discussion is informal; the proof techniques are similar to single-predecessor workflows and are given in
Appendix C.
Observation 1: Need for propagation through private modules. All examples in the previous sec-
tions that showed the necessity of the single-predecessor assumption for private module mi had another
private module mk as which is a successor of one public module in the public closure of mi. For instance, in
the proof of Proposition 1 (see Figure 4a) mi = m1 and mk = m4. If we had continued hiding output attributes
of m4, we could obtain the required possible worlds leading to a non-trivial privacy guarantee Γ > 1. This
implies that for general workflows, the propagation of attribute hiding should continue outside the public
closure and through the descendant private modules.
Observation 2: D-safety suffices (instead of UD-safety). The proof of Lemma 1 shows that
the UD-safety property of modules in the public-closure is needed only when some public module in the
public-closure has a private successor whose output attributes are visible. If all modules in the public clo-
sure have no such private successor, then a downstream-safety property (called the D-safety property) is
sufficient. More generally, if attribute hiding is propagated through private modules (as discussed above),
then it suffices to require the hidden attributes to satisfy the D-safety property rather than the stronger
UD-safety property.
The intuition from the above two observations is formalized in a privacy theorem for general workflows,
analogous to Theorem 2. First, instead of public-closure, it uses downward-closure: for a private module mi,
and a set of hidden attributes hi, the downward-closure D(hi) consists of all modules (public or private) m j,
that are reachable from mi by a directed path. Second, instead of requiring the sets Hi of hidden attributes to
ensure UD-safety , it requires them to only ensure D-safety.
The proof of the revised theorem is similar to that of Theorem 2, with the added complication that the Hi
subsets are no longer guaranteed to be disjoint. This is resolved by proving that D-safesubsets are closed
under union, allowing for the (possibly overlapping) Hi subsets computed for the individual private modules
to be unioned.
The hardness results from the previous section transfer to the case of general workflows. Since the Hi-s
in this case may be overlapping, the union of optimal Hi solutions for individual modules mi may not give the
optimal solution for the workflow. Whether or not there exists a non-trivial approximation is an interesting
open problem.
To conclude the discussion, note that for single-predecessor workflows, we now have two options to en-
sure workflow-privacy: (i) to consider public-closures and ensure UD-safety properties for their modules
(following the privacy theorem for single-predecessor workflows); or (ii) to consider downward-closures
and ensure D-safety properties for their modules (following the privacy theorem for general workflows).
Observe that these two options are incomparable: Satisfying UD-safety properties may require hiding
more attributes than what is needed for satisfying D-safety properties. On the other hand, the downward-
closure includes more modules than the public-closure (for instance the reachable private modules), and
additional attributes must be hidden to satisfy their D-safety properties. One could therefore run both
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algorithms, and choose the lower cost solution.
6 Related Work
Privacy concerns with respect to provenance were articulated in [16], in the context of scientific workflows,
and in [17], in the context of business processes. Preserving module privacy in all-private workflows was
studied in [15] and the idea of privatizing (hiding the “name” of) public modules to achieve privacy in
public/private workflows was proposed. Unfortunately this is not realistic for many common scenarios. This
paper thus presents a novel propagation model for attribute hiding which does not place any assumptions on
the user’s prior knowledge about public modules.
Recent work by other authors includes the development of fine-grained access control languages for
provenance [30, 32, 7, 8], and a graph grammar approach for rewriting redaction policies over prove-
nance [9]. The approach in [6] provides users with informative graph query results using surrogates, which
give less sensitive versions of nodes/edges, and proposes a utility measure for the result. A framework to
output a partial view of a workflow that conforms to a given set of access permissions on the connections
and input/output ports was proposed in [10]. Although related to module privacy, the approach may discon-
nect connections between modules rather than just hiding the data which flows between them; furthermore,
it may hide more provenance information than our mechanism. More importantly, the notion of privacy is
informal and no guarantees on the quality of the solutions are provided.
A related area is that of privacy-preserving data mining (see surveys [4, 33], and the references therein).
Here, the goal is to hide individual data attributes while retaining the suitability of the data for mining
patterns. Privacy preserving approaches have been studied for social networks (e.g. [5]), auditing queries
(e.g. [29]), network routing [24], and several other contexts.
Our notion of module privacy is closest to the notion of ℓ-diversity considered in [27] which addresses
some shortcomings of κ-anonymity [31]. The notion of ℓ-diversity tries to generalize the values of the
non-sensitive attributes so that for every such generalization, there are at least ℓ different values of sensitive
attributes. The view-based approach for k-anonymity along with its complexity has been studied in [37].
Leakage of information due to knowledge on the techniques for minimizing data loss has been studied in
[34, 22, 14, 35]; however, our privacy guarantees are information theoretic under our assumptions.
Nevertheless, the privacy notion of ℓ-diversity is susceptible to attack when the user has background
knowledge [23, 25]. Differential privacy [20, 18, 19], which requires that the output distribution is almost
invariant to the inclusion of any particular record, gives a stronger privacy guarantee. Although it was
first proposed for statistical databases and aggregate queries, it has since been studied in domains such
as mechanism design [28], data streaming [21], and several database-related applications (e.g. [26, 36,
13, 11]). However, it is well-known that no deterministic algorithm can guarantee differential privacy, and
the standard approach of including random noise is not suitable for our purposes — provenance queries
are typically not aggregate queries, and we need the output views to be consistent (e.g. the same module
must map the same input to the same output in all executions of the workflow). Defining an appropriate
notion of differential privacy for module functionality with respect to provenance queries is an interesting
open problem. It would also be interesting to study natural attacks for our application, and (theoretically or
empirically) study the effectiveness of various notions of privacy under these attacks (see e.g. [12]).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the problem of preserving module privacy in public/private workflows (called
workflow-privacy), by providing a view of provenance information in which the input to output mapping
of private modules remains hidden. As several examples in this paper show, the workflow-privacy of a
module critically depends on the structure (connection patterns) of the workflow, the behavior/functionality
of other modules in the workflow, and the selection of hidden attributes. We showed how workflow-privacy
can be achieved by propagating data hiding through public modules in both single-predecessor and general
workflows.
Several interesting future research directions related to the application of differential privacy were dis-
cussed in Section 6. We assumed certain assumptions in the paper (constant domain size, acyclic nature
of workflows, analysis using relations of executions, etc.). Even with these assumptions, the problem is
highly non-trivial and large and important classes of workflows can be captured even under these assump-
tion. However, it would be immensely important to have models and solutions that can be used in scientific
experiments in practice. We have also mentioned the shortcomings of the Γ-privacy and the difficulty in
using stronger privacy notions like differential privacy in the previous section. It will be interesting to see if
the possible world model thoroughly studied in this paper can be used to facilitate the use of other privacy
models under provenance queries.
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a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
r1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
r3 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
r4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4: Relation Ra for workflow Wa given in Figure 6a
A Proofs from Section 4
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
By Definition 9, a workflow W is not a single-predecessor workflow, if one of the following holds: (i) there
is a public module m j in W that belongs to the public-closure of a private module mi but has no directed path
from mi, or, (ii) such a public module m j has directed path from more than one private modules, or, (iii) W
has data sharing.
To prove the proposition we provide three example workflows where exactly one of the violating con-
ditions (i), (ii), (iii) holds, and Theorem 2 does not hold in those workflows. Case (i) was shown in Section
4.1.1. To complete the proof we demonstrate here cases (ii) and (iii).
Multiple private predecessor We give an example where Theorem 2 does not hold when a public module
belonging to a public-closure has more than one private predecessors.
Example 8. Consider the workflow Wa in Figure 6a, which is a modification of Wa by the addition of private
module m0, that takes a0 as input and produces a2 = m0(a0) = a0 as output. The public module m3 is in
public-closure of m1, but has directed public paths from both m0 and m1. The relation Ra for Wa in given in
Table 4 where the hidden attributes {a2,a3,a4,a5} are colored in grey.
Now we have exactly the same problem as before: When m̂1 maps 0 to 1, a5 = 1 irrespective of the value
of a4. In the first row a6 = 0, whereas in the second row a6 = 1. However, whatever the new definitions of
m̂0 are for m0 and m̂4 for m4, m̂4 cannot map 1 to both 0 and 1. Hence Γ = 1. ✷
Data sharing Now we give an example where Theorem 2 does not hold when the workflow has data
sharing.
Example 9. Consider the workflow, say Wb, given in Figure 6b. All attributes take values in {0,1}. The
initial inputs are a1,a2, and final outputs are a6,a7; only m4 is public. The functionality of modules is as
follows: (i) m1 takes a1,a2 as input and produces m1(a1,a2) = (a3 = a1,a4 = a2). (ii) m2 takes a3,a4 as
input and produces a5 =m2(a3,a4)= a3∨a4 (OR). (iii) m3 takes a5 as input and produces a6 =m3(a5)= a5.
(iv) m4 takes a3 as input and produces a7 = m4(a3) = a3. Note that data a3 is input to both m2,m4, hence
the workflow has data sharing.
Now focus on private module m1 = mi. Clearly hiding output a3 of m1 gives 2-standalone privacy.
and for hidden attribute hi = {a3}, the public-closure C(hi) = {m2}. As given in the theorem, Hi ⊆ Oi ∪⋃
j:m j∈C(hi) A j = {a3,a4,a5} in this case.
We claim that hiding even all of {a3,a4,a5} gives only trivial 1-workflow-privacy of m1, although the
UD-safe condition is satisfied for m2 (actually hiding a3,a4 gives 4-standalone-privacy for m1). Table 5
gives the relation Rb, where the hidden attribute values are in Grey.
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(a) m3 has paths from m0,m1 (b) a3 is shared as input to m2,m3
Figure 6: Proof of Proposition 1: (a) Multiple private predecessors, (b) Data sharing. White modules are
public, Grey are private.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
r1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r2 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
r3 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
r4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 5: Relation Rb for workflow Wb given in Figure 6.
When a3 (and also a4) is hidden, a possible candidate output of input tuple x = (0,0) to m1 is (1,0). So
we need to have a possible world where m1 is redefined as m̂1(0,0) = (1,0). Then a5 takes value 1 in the first
row, and this is the only row with visible attributes a1 = 0,a2 = 0. So this requires that m̂3(a5 = 1) = (a6 = 0)
and m̂4(a3 = 1) = (a7 = 0), to have the same projection on visible a6,a7.
The second, third and fourth rows, r2,r3,r4, have a6 = 1, so to have the same projection, we need a5 = 0
for these three rows, so we need m̂3(a5 = 0) = (a6 = 1) (since we had to already define m̂3(1) = 0). When a5
is 0, since the public module m2 is an OR function, the only possibility of the values of a3,a4 in rows r2,r3,r4
are (0,0). Now we have a conflict on the value of the visible attribute a7, which is 0 for r2 but 1 for r3,r4,
whereas for all these rows the value of a3 is 0. m̂4 being a function with dependency a3 → a7, cannot map a3
to both 0 and 1. Similarly we can check that if m̂1(0,0) = (0,1) or m̂1(0,0) = (1,1) (both a3,a4 are hidden),
we will have exactly the same problem. Hence all possible worlds of Rd with these hidden attributes must
map m̂1(0,0) to (0,0), and therefore Γ = 1. ✷
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 1 uses the following lemma. It states that the if y is a candidate output of an input
x to module mi with respect to hidden attributes hi (i.e. y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi ), then y and the actual output of x,
z = mi(x), must be equivalent.
Lemma 3. Let mi be a standalone private module with relation Ri, let x be an input to mi, and let hi ⊆ Oi
be a subset of hidden attributes. If y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi then y ≡hi z where z = mi(x).
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Note that, in Example 7, y = (1,0) and z = (0,0) are equivalent on the visible attributes as Lemma 3
says (hidden attributes are underlined).
Proof. A subset of output attributes of mi, hi ⊆ Oi, is hidden. Recall that Ai = Ii ∪Oi denotes the set of
attributes of mi and let Ri be the standalone relation for mi. If y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi , then from Definition 2,
∃R′ ∈ Worlds(Ri,hi), ∃t′ ∈ R′ s.t x = ΠIi(t′)∧y = ΠOi(t′) (1)
Further, from Definition 1, R′ ∈ Worlds(Ri,hi) only if ΠAi\hi(Ri) = ΠAi\hi(R′). Hence there must exist a
tuple t ∈ Ri such that
ΠAi\hi(t) = ΠAi\hi(t
′) (2)
Since hi ⊆Oi, Ii ⊆Ai\hi. From (2), ΠIi(t)=ΠIi(t′)= x. Let z=ΠOi(t), i.e. z=mi(x). From (2), ΠOi\hi(t)=
ΠOi\hi(t′), then ΠOi\hi(z) = ΠOi\hi(y). Tuples y and z are defined on Oi. Hence from Definition 7, y ≡hi
z.
Corollary 1. For a module mi, and hidden attributes hi ⊆ Oi, if two tuples y,z defined on Oi are such that
y ≡hi z, then also y ≡Hi z where Hi ⊇ hi is a set of hidden attributes in the workflow.
Proof. Since y ≡hi z, ΠOi\hi(y) = ΠOi\hi(z). Since hi ⊆ Hi, Oi \ hi ⊇ Oi \Hi. Therefore, ΠOi\Hi(y) =
ΠOi\Hi(z), i.e. y ≡Hi z.
Note. Lemma 3 does not use any property of single-predecessor workflows and also works for general
workflows. This lemma will be used again for the privacy theorem of general workflows (Theorem 5).
Definition of FLIP and EFLIP (extended FLIP) functions. To prove Lemma 1, we need to show exis-
tence of a possible world satisfying the criteria. This possible world will be obtained by joining alternative
definitions of private modules, and the original definition of public modules. We will need the following flip-
ping functions to formally present how we derive the alternative module definitions from original modules.
These function examines parts of inputs, and possibly changes parts of original outputs.
Definition 10. Given subsets of attributes P,Q ⊆ A, two tuples p,q defined on P, and a tuple u defined on
Q, FLIPp,q(u) = w is a tuple defined on Q constructed as follows:
• if ΠQ∩P(u) = ΠQ∩P(p), then w is such that ΠQ∩P(w) = ΠQ∩P(q) and ΠQ\P(w) = ΠQ\P(w),
• else if ΠQ∩P(u) = ΠQ∩P(q), then w is such that ΠQ∩P(w) = ΠQ∩P(p) and ΠQ\P(w) = ΠQ\P(w),
• otherwise, w = u.
The following observations capture the properties of FLIP function.
Observation 1.
1. If FLIPp,q(u) = w, then FLIPp,q(w) = u.
2. FLIPp,q(FLIPp,q(u)) = u.
3. If P∩Q = /0, FLIPp,q(u) = u.
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4. FLIPp,q(p) = q,FLIPp,q(q) = p.
5. If ΠQ∩P(p) = ΠQ∩P(q), then FLIPp,q(u) = u.
6. If Q = Q1 ∪Q2, where Q1∩Q2 = /0, and if FLIPp,q(ΠQ1(u)) = w1 and FLIPp,q(ΠQ2(u)) = w2, then
FLIPp,q(u) = w such that ΠQ1(w) = w1 and ΠQ2(w) = w2.
The above definition of flipping will be useful when we consider the scenario where M does not have
any successor. When M has successors, we need an extended definition of tuple flipping based on other
tuples, denoted by EFLIP, as defined below.
Definition 11. Given subsets of attributes P,Q,R ⊆ A, where two tuples p,q defined on P∪R, a tuple u
defined on Q and a tuple v defined on R, EFLIPp,q;v(u) = w is a tuple defined on Q constructed as follows:
• if v = ΠR(p), then w is such that ΠQ∩P(w) = ΠQ∩P(q) and ΠQ\P(w) = ΠQ\P(w),
• else if v = ΠR(q), then w is such that ΠQ∩P(w) = ΠQ∩P(p) and ΠQ\P(w) = ΠQ\P(w),
• otherwise, w = u.
Note that EFLIPp,q;ΠP∩Q(u)(u) = FLIPp,q(u), where R = P∩Q.
Observation 2. 1. If EFLIPp,q;v(u) = w, and u′ is a tuple defined on Q′ ⊆ Q , then EFLIPp,q;v(u′) =
ΠQ′(w).
Proof of Lemma 1. Now we are ready to prove the lemma. As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, we will assume
that there is a single (composite) public module M in the public closure C(hi) of mi. Recall that Ii,Oi,Ai
denote the set of input, output and all attributes of mi respectively.
LEMMA 1. Consider a standalone private module mi, a set of hidden attributes hi, any input x to mi,
and any candidate output y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi of x. Then y ∈ OUTx,W,Hi when mi belongs to a single-predecessor
workflow W , and a set attributes Hi ⊆ A is hidden such that (i) hi ⊆Hi, (ii) only output attributes from Oi are
included in hi (i.e. hi ⊆ Oi), and (iii) every module m j in the public-closure C(hi) is UD-safe with respect
to Hi.
Proof. We fix a module mi, an input x to mi, hidden attributes hi ⊆Oi, and a candidate output y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi
for x. We assume that there is a single public module M in the public closure C(hi). By the properties of
single-predecessor workflows, M gets all its inputs from mi and sends its outputs to zero or more than one
private modules. We denote the inputs and outputs of M by I ⊆ hi and O respectively. However mi can also
send (i) its visible outputs to other public modules (these public modules will have mi as its only predecessor,
but these public modules will not have any public path in undirected sense to M), and it can send (ii) visible
and hidden attributes to other private modules.
From the conditions in the lemma, a set Hi is hidden in the workflow where (i) hi ⊆ Hi, (ii) hi ⊆ Oi, and
(iii) M is UD-safe with respect to Hi. We will show that y ∈ OUTx,W,Hi . We prove this by showing the
existence of a possible world R′ ∈ Worlds(R,Hi), such that if ΠIi(t) = x for some t ∈ R′, then ΠOi(t) = y.
Since y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi , by Lemma 3, y ≡hi z where z = mi(x). We consider two cases separately based on
whether M has no successor or at least one private successors.
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Case I. First consider the easier case that M does not have any successor, so all outputs of M belong
to the set of final outputs. We redefine the module mi to m̂i as follows. For an input u to mi, m̂i(u) =
FLIPy,z(mi(u)). All public modules are unchanged, m̂ j = m j. All private modules m j 6= mi are redefined as
follows: On an input u to m j, m̂ j(u) = m j(FLIPy,z(u)). The required possible world R′ is obtained by taking
the join of the standalone relations of these m̂ j-s, j ∈ [n].
First note that by the definition of m̂i, m̂i(x) = y (since m̂i(x) = FLIPy,z(mi(x)) = FLIPy,z(z) = y, from
Observation 1(4)). Hence if ΠIi(t) = x for some t ∈ R′, then ΠOi(t) = y.
Next we argue that R′ ∈ Worlds(R,Hi). Since R′ is the join of the standalone relations for modules m̂ j-s,
R′ maintains all functional dependencies I j → O j. Also none of the public modules are unchanged, hence
for any public module m j and any tuple t in R′, ΠO j(t) = m j(ΠI j(t)). So we only need to show that the
projection of R and R′ on the visible attributes are the same.
Let us assume, wlog. that the modules are numbered in topologically sorted order. Let I0 be the initial
input attributes to the workflow, and let p be a tuple defined on I0. There are two unique tuples t ∈ R and
t′ ∈ R′ such that ΠI1(t) = ΠI1(t′) = p. Since M does not have any successor, let us assume that M = mn+1,
also wlog. assume that the public modules in C are not counted in j = 1 to n+ 1 by renumbering the
modules. Note that any intermediate or final attribute a ∈ A\ I0 belongs to O j, for a unique j ∈ [1,n] (since
for j 6= ℓ, O j∩Oℓ = φ ). So it suffices to show that t, t ′ projected on O j are equivalent with respect to visible
attributes for all module j, j = 1 to n+1.
Let c j,m,c j,m̂ be the values of input attributes I j and d j,m,d j,m̂ be the values of output attributes O j of
module m j, in t ∈ R and t′ ∈ R′ respectively on initial input attributes p (i.e. c j,m = ΠI j(t), c j,m̂ = ΠI j(t′),
d j,m = ΠO j(t) and d j,m̂ = ΠO j(t′)). We prove by induction on j = 1 to n that
∀ j,1 ≤ j ≤ n,d j,m̂ = FLIPy,z(d j,m) (3)
First we argue that proving (3) shows that the join of 〈m̂i〉1≤i≤n is a possible world of R with respect
to hidden attributes Hi. (A) When m j is a private module, note that d j,m and d j,m̂ = FLIPy,z(d j,m) may differ
only on attributes O j ∩Oi But y ≡hi z, i.e. these tuples are equivalent on the visible attributes. Hence for
all private modules, the t, t ′ are equivalent with respect to O j. (actually for all j 6= i, O j ∩Oi = /0, so the
outputs are equal and therefore equivalent). (B) When m j is a public module, j 6= n+1, O j∩Oi = /0, hence
the values of t, t ′ on O j are the same and therefore equivalent. (C) Finally, consider M = mn+1 that is not
covered by (3). M gets all its inputs from mi. From (3),
di,m̂ = FLIPy,z(di,m)
Since y,z,di,m,di,m̂ are all defined on attributes Oi, and input to mn+1, In+1 ⊆ Oi,
cn+1,m̂ = FLIPy,z(cn+1,m)
Hence cn+1,m̂ ≡Hi cn+1,m. Since these two inputs of mn+1 are equivalent with respect to Hi, by the UD-safe
property of M = mn+1, its outputs are also equivalent, i.e. dn+1,m̂ ≡Hi dn+1,m. Hence the projections of t, t ′
on On+1 are also equivalent. Combining (A), (B), (C), t, t ′ are equivalent with respect to Hi.
Proof of (3). The base case follows for j = 1. If m1 6= mi (m j can be public or private), then I1∩Oi = /0,
so for all input u,
m̂ j(u) = m j(FLIPy,z(u)) = m j(u)
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Since the inputs c1,m̂ = c1,m (both projections of initial input p on I1), the outputs d1,m̂ = d1,m. This
shows (3). If m1 = mi, the inputs are the same, and by definition of m̂1,
d1,m̂ = m̂1(c1,m̂)
= FLIPy,z(mi(c1,m̂))
= FLIPy,z(mi(c1,m))
= FLIPy,z(d1,m)
This shows (3).
Suppose the hypothesis holds until j−1, consider m j. From the induction hypothesis, c j,m̂ = FLIPy,z(c j,m),
hence c j,m = FLIPy,z(c j,m̂) (see Observation 1 (1)).
(i) If j = i, again,
di,m̂ = m̂i(ci,m̂)
= FLIPy,z(mi(ci,m̂))
= FLIPy,z(mi(FLIPy,z(ci,m)))
= FLIPy,z(mi((ci,m))
= FLIPy,z(di,m)
FLIPy,z(ci,m) = ci,m follows due to the fact that Ii ∩Oi = /0, y,z are defined on Oi, whereas ci,m is
defined on Ii (see Observation 1 (3)).
(ii) If j 6= i and m j is a private module,
d j,m̂ = m̂ j(c j,m̂)
= m j(FLIPy,z(c j,m̂))
= m j(c j,m)
= d j,m
= FLIPy,z(d j,m)
FLIPy,z(d j,m) = d j,m follows due to the fact that O j ∩Oi = /0, y,z are defined on Oi, whereas di,m is
defined on O j (again see Observation 1 (3)).
(iii) If m j is a public module, j ≤ n, m̂ j = m j.
Here
d j,m̂ = m̂ j(c j,m̂)
= m j(c j,m̂)
= m j(FLIPy,z(c j,m))
= m j(c j,m)
= d j,m
= FLIPy,z(d j,m)
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FLIPy,z(d j,m) = d j,m again follows due to the fact that O j ∩Oi = /0. FLIPy,z(c j,m) = c j,m follows
due to following reason. If I j ∩Oi = /0, i.e. if m j does not get any input from mi, again this is true
(Observation 1(3)). If m j gets an input from mi, i.e. I j ∩Oi 6= /0, since m j 6= mn+1, I j ∩Oi does not
include any hidden attributes from hi. But y≡hi z, i.e. the visible attribute values of y,z are the same.
In other words, ΠI j∩Oi(y) = ΠI j∩Oi(z), and from Observation 1 (5), FLIPy,z(c j,m) = c j,m.
This completes the proof of the lemma for Case-I.
Case II.
Now consider the case when M has one or more private successors (note that M cannot have any public
successor by definition). Let M = mk, and assume that the modules m1, · · · ,mn are sorted in topological
order. Hence I = Ik,O = Ok, and Ik ⊆ Oi. Let wy = M(ΠIk(y)), wz = M(ΠIk(z)). Instead of y,z, the flip
function will be with respect to Y,Z, where Y is the concatenation of y and wy (ΠOi(Y) = y, ΠOk(Y) = wy),
and Z is the concatenation of z and wz. Hence Y,Z are defined on attributes Oi∪Ok.
We redefine the module mi to m̂i as follows. Note that since input to M, Ik ⊆ Oi, Oi is disjoint union of
Ik and Oi \ Ik. For an input u to mi, m̂i(u), defined on Oi is such that
ΠOi\Ik(m̂i(u)) = FLIPY,Z(ΠOi\Ik(mi(u)))
and
ΠIk(m̂i(u)) = EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (mi(u)))(ΠIk(mi(u)))
For the component with EFLIP, in terms of the notations in Definition 11, R = Ok, P = Q = Oi. p = Y,q =
Z, defined on P∪R = Oi∪Ok. v = M(ΠIk(mi(u))), defined on Ok. u in Definition 11 corresponds to mi(u).
All public modules are unchanged, m̂ j = m j. All private modules m j 6= mi are redefined as follows: On an
input u to m j, m̂ j(u) = m j(FLIPY,Z(u)). The required possible world R′ is obtained by taking the join of the
standalone relations of these m̂ j-s, j ∈ [n].
First note that by the definition of m̂i, m̂i(x) = y due to the following reason:
(i) M(ΠIk(mi(x))) = M(ΠIk(z)) = wz = ΠOk(Z), so
ΠIk(m̂i(x)) = EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (mi(x)))(ΠIk(mi(x)))
= EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (z))(ΠIk(z))
= ΠIk(y))
(ii)
ΠOi\Ik(m̂i(x)) == FLIPY,Z(ΠOi\Ik(mi(x)))
= FLIPY,Z(ΠOi\Ik(z))
= ΠOi\Ik(y)
Taking union of (i) and (ii), m̂i(x) = y. Hence if ΠIi(t) = x for some t ∈ R′, then ΠOi(t) = y.
Again, next we argue that R′ ∈ Worlds(R,Hi), and it suffices to show that the projection of R and R′ on
the visible attributes are the same.
Let I0 be the initial input attributes to the workflow, and let p be a tuple defined on I0. There are two
unique tuples t ∈ R and t′ ∈ R′ such that ΠI1(t) = ΠI1(t′) = p. Note that any intermediate or final attribute
a ∈ A\ I0 belongs to O j, for a unique j ∈ [1,n] (since for j 6= ℓ, O j∩Oℓ = φ ). So it suffices to show that t, t ′
projected on O j are equivalent with respect to visible attributes for all module j, j = 1 to n+1.
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Let c j,m,c j,m̂ be the values of input attributes I j and d j,m,d j,m̂ be the values of output attributes O j of
module m j, in t ∈ R and t′ ∈ R′ respectively on initial input attributes p (i.e. c j,m = ΠI j(t), c j,m̂ = ΠI j(t′),
d j,m = ΠO j(t) and d j,m̂ = ΠO j(t′)). We prove by induction on j = 1 to n that
∀ j 6= i,1 ≤ j ≤ n,d j,m̂ = FLIPY,Z(d j,m) (4)
ΠIk(di,m̂) = EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (di,m))(ΠIk(di,m)) (5)
ΠOi\Ik(di,m̂) = FLIPY,Z(ΠOi\Ik(di,m)) (6)
First we argue that proving (4), (5) and (6) shows that the join of 〈m̂i〉1≤i≤n is a possible world of R with
respect to hidden attributes Hi.
(A) When m j is a private module, j 6= i, note that d j,m and d j,m̂ = FLIPY,Z(d j,m) may differ only on
attributes (Ok ∪Oi)∩O j. But for j 6= i and j 6= k (m j is private module whereas mk is the composite
public module), (Ok ∪Oi)∩O j = /0. Hence for all private modules other than mi, the t, t ′ are equal
with respect to O j and therefore equivalent.
(B) For mi, from (5),
ΠIk(di,m̂) = EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (di,m))(ΠIk(di,m)). Here ΠIk(di,m) and ΠIk(di,m̂) may differ on Ik only if
M(ΠIk(di,m)) ∈ {wy,wz}. By Corollary cor:out-equiv, y ≡Hi z, i.e. ΠIk(y) ≡Hi ΠIk(z). But since M is
UDS, by the downstream-safety property, wy ≡Hi wz. Then by the upstream-safety property, all inputs
ΠIk(di,m) ≡Hi y ≡Hi z such that M(ΠIk(di,m)) ∈ {wy,wz}. In particular, if M(ΠIk(di,m)) = wy, then
ΠIk(di,m̂) = ΠIk(z), and
ΠIk(z),ΠIk (di,m) will be equivalent with respect to Hi. Similarly, if M(ΠIk(di,m))=wz, then ΠIk(di,m̂)=
ΠIk(y), and ΠIk(y),ΠIk(di,m) will be equivalent with respect to Hi. So t, t ′ are equivalent with respect
to Ik \Hi.
Next we argue that t, t ′ are equivalent with respect to (Oi \ Ik)\Hi. From (5),
ΠOi\Ik(di,m̂) = FLIPY,Z(ΠOi\Ik(di,m))
ΠOi\Ik(di,m̂) and ΠOi\Ik(di,m) can differ only if
ΠOi\Ik(di,m) = ΠOi\Ik(y). Then
ΠOi\Ik(di,m̂)=ΠOi\Ik(z), or, ΠOi\Ik(di,m)=ΠOi\Ik(z). Therefore, ΠOi\Ik(di,m̂)=ΠOi\Ik(y). But ΠOi\Ik(y)
and ΠOi\Ik(z) are equivalent with respect to Hi. Hence ΠOi\Ik(di,m) and ΠOi\Ik(di,m̂) are equivalent with
respect to Hi.
Hence t, t ′ are equivalent on Oi.
(C) When m j is a public module, d j,m̂ = FLIPY,Z(d j,m). Here d j,m,d j,m̂ can differ only on (Ok∪Oi)∩O j.
If j 6= k, the intersection is empty, and we are done. If j = k, d j,m,d j,m̂ may differ only if d j,m ∈
{wy,wz}. But note that y ≡hi z, so ΠIk(y) ≡hi ΠIk(z), and ΠIk(y) ≡Hi ΠIk(z). Since mk is UDS, for
these two equivalent inputs the respective outputs wy,wz are also equivalent. Hence in all cases the
values of t, t ′ on Ok are equivalent.
Combining (A), (B), (C), the projections of t, t ′ on O j are equivalent for all 1≤ j ≤ n; i.e. t, t ′ are equivalent
with respect to Hi
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Proof of (4), (5) and (6). The base case follows for j = 1. If m1 6= mi (m1 can be public or private, but
k 6= 1 since mi is its predecessor), then I1∩(Oi∪Ok)= /0, so for all input u, m̂ j(u)=m j(FLIPY,Z(u))=m j(u)
(if m1 is private) and m̂ j(u) = m j(u) (if m1 is public). Since the inputs c1,m̂ = c1,m (both projections of initial
input p on I1), the outputs d1,m̂ = d1,m. This shows (4). If m1 = mi, the inputs are the same, and by definition
of m̂1,
ΠIk(d1,m̂) = ΠIk(m̂1(c1,m̂))
= EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (m1(c1,m̂)))(ΠIk(m1(c1,m̂)))
= EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (m1(c1,m)))(ΠIk(m1(c1,m)))
= EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (d1,m))(ΠIk(d1,m))
This shows (5) for i = 1. Again, by definition of m̂1,
ΠO1\Ik(d1,m̂) = ΠO1\Ik(m̂1(c1,m̂))
= FLIPY,Z(ΠO1\Ik(m1(c1,m̂))
= FLIPY,Z(ΠO1\Ik(m1(c1,m))
= FLIPY,Z(ΠO1\Ik(d1,m))
This shows (6).
Suppose the hypothesis holds until j−1, consider m j. From the induction hypothesis, if I j∩Oi = /0 (m j
does not get input from mi) then c j,m̂ = FLIPY,Z(c j,m), hence c j,m = FLIPY,Z(c j,m̂) (see Observation 1(1)).
(i) If j = i, Ii∩Oi = /0, hence ci,m̂ = FLIPY,Z(ci,m) = ci,m (Ii ∩ (Oi∪Ok) = /0, mk is a successor of mi, so
mi cannot be successor of mk). By definition of m̂i,
ΠIk(di,m̂) = ΠIk(m̂i(ci,m̂))
= EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (mi(ci,m̂)))(ΠIk(mi(ci,m̂)))
= EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (mi(ci,m)))(ΠIk(mi(ci,m)))
= EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (di,m))(ΠIk(di,m))
This shows (5).
Again,
ΠOi\Ik(di,m̂) = ΠOi\Ik(m̂i(ci,m̂))
= FLIPY,Z(ΠOi\Ik(mi(ci,m̂)))
= FLIPY,Z(ΠOi\Ik(mi(ci,m)))
= FLIPY,Z(ΠOi\Ik(di,m))
This shows (6).
(ii) If j = k, mk gets all its inputs from mi, so ΠIk(di,m) = ck,m. Hence
ck,m̂ = EFLIPY,Z;M(ΠIk (di,m))(ck,m)
= EFLIPY,Z;M(ck,m)(ck,m)
= EFLIPY,Z;dk,m(ck,m)
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Therefore,
dk,m̂ = m̂k(ck,m̂)
= mk(ck,m̂)
= mk(EFLIPY,Z;dk,m(ck,m))
Lets evaluate the term mk(EFLIPY,Z;dk,m(ck,m)). This says that for an input to mk is ck,m, and its output
dk,m, (a) if dk,m = wy, then
EFLIPY,Z;dk,m(ck,m) = ΠIk(z),
and in turn
dk,m̂ = mk(EFLIPY,Z;dk,m(ck,m)) = wz;
(b) if dk,m = wz, then
EFLIPY,Z;dk,m(ck,m) = ΠIk(y),
and in turn
dk,m̂ = mk(EFLIPY,Z;dk,m(ck,m)) = wy;
(c) otherwise
dk,m̂ = mk(EFLIPY,Z;dk,m(ck,m))
= mk(ck,m) = dk,m
According to Definition 10, the above implies that
dk,m̂ = FLIPwy,wz(dk,m)
= FLIPY,Z(dk,m)
This shows (4).
(iii) If j 6= i and m j is a private module, m j can get inputs from mi. (but since there is no data sharing
I j ∩ Ik = /0), and other private or public modules mℓ, ℓ 6= i (ℓ can be equal to k). Let us partition the
input to m j (c j,m and c j,m̂ defined on I j) on attributes I j ∩Oi and I j \Oi From (4), using the induction
hypothesis,
ΠI j\Oi(c j,m̂) = FLIPY,Z(ΠI j\Oi(c j,m)) (7)
Now Ik ∩ I j = /0, since there is no data sharing. Hence (I j ∩Oi) ⊆ (Oi \ Ik). From (6) using Observa-
tion 2,
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ΠI j∩Oi(c j,m̂) = FLIPY,Z(ΠI j∩Oi(c j,m)) (8)
From (7) and (8), using Observation 1 (6), and since c j,m,c j,m̂ are defined on I j, so
c j,m̂ = FLIPY,Z(c j,m) (9)
From (9),
d j,m̂ = m̂ j(c j,m̂)
= m j(FLIPY,Z(c j,m̂))
= m j(c j,m)
= d j,m
= FLIPY,Z(d j,m)
FLIPY,Z(d j,m) = d j,m follows due to the fact that O j ∩ (Oi∪Ok) = /0 ( j 6= {i,k}), Y,Z are defined on
Oi∪Ok, whereas d j,m is defined on O j (again see Observation 1 (3)).
(iv) Finally consider m j is a public module such that j 6= k. m j can still get input from mi, but none of the
attributes in I j ∩Oi can be hidden by the definition of mk = M = C(hi). Further, by the definition of
M = mk, m j cannot get any input from mk (M is the closure of public module); so I j ∩Ok = /0. Let us
partition the inputs to m j (c j,m and c j,m̂ defined on I j) into three two disjoint subsets: (a) I j ∩Oi, and
(b) I j \Oi. Since there is no data sharing Ik∩ I j = /0, and we again get (9) that
c j,m̂ = FLIPY,Z(c j,m)
= c j,m
FLIPy,z(c j,m) = c j,m follows due to following reason. If I j ∩Oi = /0, i.e. if m j does not get any
input from mi, again this is true (then I j ∩ (Oi∪Ok) = (I j ∩Oi)∪ (I j ∩Ok) = /0). If m j gets an input
from mi, i.e. I j ∩Oi 6= /0, since j 6= k, I j ∩Oi does not include any hidden attributes from hi (mk is
the closure C(hi)).But y ≡hi z, i.e. the visible attribute values of y,z are the same. In other words,
ΠI j∩Oi(y) = ΠI j∩Oi(z), and again from Observation 1 (5),
FLIPY,Z(c j,m) = FLIPy,z(c j,m) = c j,m
(again, I j ∩Ok = /0).
Therefore,
d j,m̂ = m̂ j(c j,m̂)
= m j(c j,m̂)
= m j(FLIPY,Z(c j,m))
= m j(c j,m)
= d j,m
= FLIPY,Z(d j,m)
FLIPY,Z(d j,m) = d j,m again follows due to the fact that O j ∩ (Oi∪Ok) = /0, since j /∈ {i,k}.
Hence all the cases for the induction hypothesis hold true, and this completes the proof of the lemma for
Case-II.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Recall that Ii,Oi,Ai denote the set of input, output and all attributes of a module mi.
LEMMA 2. Let M be a composite module consisting only of public modules. Let H be a subset of hidden
attributes such that every public module m j in M is UD-safe with respect to A j∩H. Then M is UD-safe
with respect to (I∪O)∩H.
Proof. Let us assume, wlog., that the modules in M are m1, · · · ,mp where modules are listed in topological
order. For j = 1 to p, let M j be the composite module comprising m1, · · · ,m j, and let I j,O j be its input and
output. Hence Mp = M, Ip = I and Op = O. We prove by induction on 2≤ j ≤ p that M j is UD-safe with
respect to H∩ (I j∪O j). We present the proof without going through the notations for the sake of simplicity.
The base case directly follows for j = 1, since A1 = I1∪O1 = I1∪O1. Let the hypothesis hold until M j
and consider M j+1. By induction hypothesis, M j is UD-safe with respect to (I j ∪O j)∩H . The module
m j+1 may consume some outputs of M j (m2 to m j). Hence
I j+1 = I j∪ I j+1 \O j and O j+1 = O j ∪O j+1 \ I j+1 (10)
Consider two equivalent inputs x1,x2 with respect to hidden attributes H ∩ (I j+1∪O j+1)). Therefore
their projection on visible attributes I j+1 \H = (I j+1∪O j+1)\H are the same ———–(A)
Partition I j+1 into I j and I j+1 \ I j = I j+1 \ I j. Projection of x1 and x2, let x11,x12, on I j \H will be the
same. Therefore, the inputs to M j are equivalent. By hypothesis, their outputs, say z1,z2 will have same
values on O j \H = (I j+1∪O j+1)\H ———– (B).
Again, on inputs x1,x2 to M j+1, inputs to m j+1 will be concatenation of (i) projection of output z1,z2
from M j on O j ∩ I j+1 and (ii) projection of x1,x2 on I j+1 \ I j. From (A) and (B), they will be equivalent on
visible attributes (I j+1∪O j+1) \H . Therefore, the inputs to m j+1 are equivalent with respect to H . Since
m j+1 is UD-safe, the outputs, say w1,w2 are also equivalent ————(C).
Now note that y1 is defined on O j+1 = (O j \ I j+1)∪O j+1. Its projection on O j \ I j+1 is projection of
z1 on O j \ I j+1, and its projection on O j+1 is z1. Similarly y2 can be partitioned. From (B) and (C), the
projections are equivalent, therefore the outputs y1 and y2 are equivalent.
This shows that for two equivalent input the outputs are equivalent. The other direction, for two equiva-
lent outputs all of their inputs are equivalent can be proved in similar way by considering modules in reverse
topological order from mk to m2.
B Proofs from Section 5
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
THEOREM 3. Given public module m j with k attributes, and a subset of hidden attributes H, deciding
whether m j is UD-safe with respect to H is coNP-hard in k. Further, all UD-safe subsets can be found
in EXP-time in k.
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Proof of NP-hardness
Proof. We do a reduction from UNSAT, where given n variables x1, · · · ,xn, and a boolean formula f (x1, · · · ,xn),
the goal is to check whether f is not satisfiable. In our construction, mi has n+ 1 inputs x1, · · · ,xn and y,
and the output is z = mi(x1, · · · ,xn,y) = f (x1, · · · ,xn)∨ y (OR). hidden attributes H = {x1, · · · ,xn}, so y,z atr
visible. We claim that f is not satisfiable if and only if mi is UD-safe with respect to H .
Suppose f is not satisfiable, so for all assignments of x1, · · · ,xn, f (x1, · · · ,xn) = 0. For output z = 0,
then the visible attribute y must have 0 value in all the rows of the relation of mi. Also for z = 1, the visible
attribute y must have 1 value, since in all rows f (x1, · · · ,xn) = 0. Hence for equivalent inputs with respect
to H , the outputs are equivalent and vice versa. Therefore mi is UD-safe with respect to H .
Now suppose f is satisfiable, then there is at least one assignment of x1, · · · ,xn, such that f (x1, · · · ,xn) =
1. In this row, for y = 0, z = 1. However for all assignments of x1, · · · ,xn, whenever y = 1, z = 1. So for
output z = 1, all inputs producing z are not equivalent with respect to the visible attribute y, therefore mi is
not upstream-safe and hence not UD-safe.
Upper Bound to Find All UD-safe Solutions The lower bounds studied for the second step of the four
step optimization show that for a public module m j, it is not possible to have poly-time algorithms (in |A j|)
even to decide if a given subset H ⊆ A j is UD-safe, unless P = NP. Here we present Algorithm 1 that
finds all UD-safe solutions of m j is time exponential in k j = |A j|, assuming that the maximum domain
size of attributes ∆ is a constant.
Time complexity. The outer for loop runs for all possible subsets of A j, i.e. 2k j times. The inner for
loop runs for maximum ∆|I j\H| times (this is the maximum number of such tuples x+), whereas the check
if H is a valid downstream-safe subset takes O(∆|I j∩H|) time. Here we ignore the time complexity to check
equality of tuples which will take only polynomial in |Ai| time and will be dominated by the exponential
terms. For the upstream-safety check, the number of 〈x+,y+〉 pairs are at most ∆|I j\H|, and to compute the
distinct number of x+,y+ tuples from the pairs can be done in O(∆2|I j\H|) time by a naive search; the time
complexity can be improved by the use of a hash function. Hence the total time complexity is dominated by
2k j ×O(∆|I j\H|)×O(∆|I j∩H|+∆2|I j\H|) =O(2k j ∆3k j ) = O(24k j ). By doing a tighter analysis, the multiplicative
factor in the exponents can be improved, however, we make the point here that the algorithm runs in time
exponential in k j = |A j|.
Correctness. The following lemma proves the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 4. Algorithm 1 adds H ⊆ A j to U j if and only if m j is UD-safe with respect to H.
Proof. (if) Suppose H is a UD-safe subset for m j. Then V is downstream-safe, i.e. for equivalent inputs
with respect to the visible attributes I j \H , the projection of the output on the visible attributes O j \H will
be the same, so H will pass the downstream-safety test.
Since H is UD-safe, H is also upstream-safe. Clearly, by definition, n1 ≥ n2. Suppose n1 > n2. Then
there are two x+1 and x
+
2 that pair with the same y+. By construction, x
+
1 and x
+
2 (and all input tuples x to m j
that project on these two tuples) have different value on the visible input attributes I j \H , but they map to
outputs y-s that have the same value on visible output attributes O j \H . Then H is not upstream-safe, which
is a contradiction. Hence n1 = n2, and H will also pass the test for upstream-safety and be included in U j.
(only if) Suppose H is not UD-safe, then it is either not upstream-safe or not downstream-safe. Sup-
pose it is not downstream-safe. Then for at least one assignment x+, the values of y generated by the assign-
ments x− will not be equivalent with respect to the visible output attributes, and the downstream-safety test
will fail.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm to find all UD-safe solutions U j for a public module m j
1: – Set U j = /0.
2: for every subset H of A j do
3: /*Check if H is downstream-safe */
4: for every assignment x+ of the visible input attributes in I j \H do
5: –Check if for every assignment x− of the hidden input attributes in I j ∩V , whether the value of
ΠO j\H(m j(x)) is the same, where ΠI j\H(x) = x+ and ΠI j∩H(x) = x−
6: if not then
7: – H is not downstream-safe.
8: – Go to the next H .
9: else
10: – H is downstream-safe.
11: – Let y+ = ΠO j\H(m j(x)) = projection of all such tuples that have projection = x+ on the visible
input attributes
12: – Label this set of input-output pairs (x,m j(x)) by 〈x+,y+〉.
13: end if
14:
15: /*Check if H is upstream-safe */
16: – Consider the pairs 〈x+,y+〉 constructed above.
17: – Let n1 be the number of distinct x+ values, and let n2 be the number of distinct y+ values/
18: if n1 == n2 then
19: – H is upstream-safe.
20: – Add H to U j.
21: else
22: – H is not upstream-safe.
23: – Go to the next H .
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
27: return The set of subsets U j.
Suppose H is downstream-safe but not upstream-safe. Then there are Then there are two x+1 and x
+
2 that
pair with the same y+. This makes n1 > n2, and the upstream-safety test will fail.
B.2 Correctness of Optimal Algorithm for Chain Workflows
Recall that after renumbering the modules, m1, · · · ,mk denote the modules in the public closure C of a
private module mi. The following lemma shows that Q[ j, ℓ] correctly stores the desired value: the cost of
minimum cost hidden subset H jℓ that satisfies the UD-safe condition for all public modules m1 to m j, and
A j ∩H jℓ =U jℓ ∈ U j. Recall that we use the simplified notations S for the safe subset Siℓ of mi, C for public
closure C(Siℓ), and H for Hi.
Lemma 5. For 1≤ j ≤ k, the entry Q[ j, ℓ], 1≤ ℓ≤ p j, stores the minimum cost of the hidden attributes H jℓ
such that ∪ jx=1Ax ⊇H jℓ ⊇ S, A j∩H jℓ =U jℓ, and every module mx,1≤ x≤ j in the chain is UD-safe with
respect to Ax \H jℓ.
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The following proposition will be useful to prove the lemma.
Proposition 3. For a public module m j, for two UD-safe hidden subsets U1,U2 ⊆A j, if U1∩O j =U2∩O j,
then U1 =U2.
The proof of the proposition is simple, and therefore is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We prove this by induction from j = 1 to k. The base case follows by the definition of Q[1, ℓ], for
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ p1. Here the requirements are A1 ⊇ H1ℓ ⊇ S, and H1ℓ = U1ℓ. So we set the cost at Q[1, ℓ] to
c(U1ℓ) = c(H1ℓ), if U1ℓ ⊇ S .
Suppose the hypothesis holds until j−1, and consider j. Let H jℓ be the minimum solution s.t. A j∩H jℓ=
U jℓ and satisfies the other conditions of the lemma.
First consider the case when there is no q such that U j−1,q∩O j−1 = U j,ℓ ∩ I j, where we set the cost to
be ∞. If there is no such q. i.e. for all q ≤ p j−1, then clearly there cannot be any solution H jℓ that contains
U j,ℓ and also guarantees UD-safe properties of all x < j (in particular for x = j−1). In that case the cost
of the solution is indeed ∞.
Otherwise (when such a q exists), let us divide the cost of the solution c(H jℓ) into two disjoint parts:
c(H jℓ) = c(H jℓ∩O j)+ c(H jℓ \O j)
We argue that c(O j ∩H jℓ) = c(O j ∩U jℓ). A j ∩H jℓ = U jℓ. Then O j ∩U jℓ = O j ∩A j ∩H jℓ = O j ∩H jℓ,
since O j ⊆ A j. Hence c(O j ∩H jℓ) = c(O j ∩U jℓ). This accounts for the cost of the first part of Q[ j, ℓ].
Next we argue that c(H jℓ \O j) = minimum cost Q[ j− 1,q], 1 ≤ q ≤ p j, where the minimum is over
those those q where U j−1,q ∩O j−1 = U j,ℓ ∩ I j. Due to the chain structure of C, O j ∩
⋃ j−1
x=1 A j = /0, and
O j∪
⋃ j−1
x=1 Ax =
⋃ j
x=1 Ax. Since ∪
j
x=1Ax ⊇ H jℓ, H jℓ \O j = H jℓ∩
⋃ j−1
x=1 Ax.
Consider H ′ = H jℓ ∩
⋃ j−1
x=1 Ax. By definition of H jℓ, H ′ must satisfy the UD-safe requirement of all
1 ≤ x ≤ j−1. Further, ⋃ j−1x=1 Ax ⊇ H ′. A j∩H jℓ =U j,ℓ, hence U j,ℓ ⊆ H jℓ.
We are considering the case where there is a q such that
U j−1,q∩O j−1 =U j,ℓ∩ I j (11)
Therefore
U j−1,q∩O j−1 ⊆U j,ℓ ⊆ H jℓ
We claim that if q satisfies (11), then A j−1 ∩H ′ = U j−1,q. Therefore, by induction hypothesis, Q[ j− 1, ℓ]
stores the minimum cost solution H ′ that includes U j−1,q, and part of the the optimal solution cost c(H jℓ\O j)
for m j is the minimum value of such Q[ j−1,q].
So it remains to show that A j−1∩H ′=U j−1,q. A j−1∩H ′=A j−1∩H jℓ ∈U j−1, since H jℓ gives UD-safe
solution for m j−1. Suppose A j−1∩H jℓ =U j−1,y. Then we argue that U j−1,q =U j−1,y, which will complete
the proof.
U j−1,y∩O j−1 = (A j−1∩H jℓ)∩O j−1 = H jℓ∩O j−1, = H jℓ∩ I j = (A j∩U j,ℓ)∩ I j, i.e.
U j−1,y∩O j−1 =U j,ℓ∩ I j (12)
From (11) and (12),
U j−1,q∩O j−1 =U j−1,y∩O j−1
since both U j−1,q,U j−1,y ∈ U j−1, from Proposition 3, U j−1,q = U j−1,y. This completes the proof of the
lemma.
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B.3 Optimal Algorithm for Tree Workflows
Here we prove Theorem 4 for tree workflows.
Optimal algorithm for tree workflows Similar to the algorithm for chain workflows, to obtain an algo-
rithm of time polynomial in L for tree workflows, for a given module mi, we can go over all choices of safe
subsets Siℓ ∈ Si of mi, compute the public-closure C(Siℓ), and choose a minimal cost subset Hi = Hi(Siℓ)
that satisfies the UD-safe properties of all modules in the public-closure. Then, output, among them, a
subset having the minimum cost. Consequently, it suffices to explain how, given a safe subset Siℓ ∈ Si, one
can solve, in PTIME, the problem of finding a minimum cost hidden subset Hi that satisfies the UD-safe
property of all modules in a subgraph formed by a given C(Siℓ).
To simplify notations, the given safe subset Siℓ will be denoted below by S, the closure C(Siℓ) will be
denoted by C, and the output hidden subset Hi will be denoted by H . Our PTIME algorithm uses dynamic
programming to find the optimal H .
First note that since C is the public-closure of (some) output attributes for a tree workflow, C is a collec-
tion of trees all of which are rooted at the private module mi. Let us consider the tree T rooted at mi with
subtrees in C, (note that mi can have private children that are not considered in T ). Let k be the number of
modules in T , and the modules in T be renumbered as mi,m1, · · · ,mk, where the private module mi is the
root, and the rest are public modules.
Now we solve the problem by dynamic programming as follows. Let Q be an k× L two-dimensional
array, where Q[ j, ℓ], 1 ≤ j ≤ k,1 ≤ ℓ ≤ p j denotes the cost of minimum cost hidden subset H jℓ that (i)
satisfies the UD-safe condition for all public modules in the subtree of T rooted at m j, that we denote
by Tj; and, (ii) H jℓ ∩ A j = U jℓ. (recall that I jO j,A j is the set of input, output and all attributes of m j
respectively); the actual solution can be stored easily by standard argument. The algorithm is described
below.
• Initialization for leaf nodes. The initialization step handles all leaf nodes m j in T . For a leaf node
m j, 1≤ ℓ≤ p j,
Q[ j, ℓ] = c(U j,ℓ)
• Internal nodes. The internal nodes are considered in a bottom-up fashion (by a post-order traversal),
and Q[ j, ℓ] is computed for a node m j after its children are processed.
For an internal node m j, let mi1 , · · · ,mix be its children in T . Then for 1 ≤ ℓ≤ p j,
1. Consider UD-safe subset U j,ℓ.
2. For y = 1 to x, let U y =U j,ℓ∩ Iiy Since there is no data sharing, U y-s are disjoint
3. For y = 1 to x,
ky = argminkQ[iy,k] where the minimum is over
1 ≤ k ≤ piy s.t. Uiy,k ∩ Iiy =U y
= ⊥ (undefined), if there is no such k
4. Q[ j, ℓ] is computed as follows.
Q[ j, ℓ] = ∞ if ∃y,1 ≤ y ≤ x, ky =⊥
= c(I j ∩U jℓ)+
x
∑
y=1
Q[iy,ky] (otherwise)
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• Final solution for S. Now consider the private module mi that is the root of T . Recall that we fixed
a safe solution S of mi for doing the analysis. Let mi1 , · · · ,mix be the children of mi in T (which are
public modules). Similar to the step before, we consider the min-cost solutions of its children which
exactly match the hidden subset S of mi.
1. Consider safe subset S of mi.
2. For y = 1 to x, let Sy = S∩ Iiy Since there is no data sharing, again, Sy-s are disjoint
3. For y = 1 to x,
ky = argminkQ[iy,k] where the minimum is over
1 ≤ k ≤ piy s.t. Uiy,k ∩ Iiy ⊇ Sy
= ⊥ (undefined), if there is no such k
4. The cost of the optimal H (let us denote that by c∗) is computed as follows.
c∗ = ∞ if ∃y,1≤ y ≤ x, ky =⊥
=
x
∑
y=1
Q[iy,ky] (otherwise)
It is not hard to see that the trivial solution of UD-safe subsets that include all attributes of the modules
gives a finite cost solution by the above algorithm.
Lemma 6 stated and proved below shows that Q[ j, ℓ] correctly stores the desired value. Given this
lemma, the correctness of the algorithm easily follows. For hidden subset H ⊇ S in the closure, for every
public child miy of mi, H ∩ Iiy ⊇ S∩ Iiy = Sy. Further, each such miy has to be UD-safe with respect to H jℓ.
In other words, for each miy , H ∩ Iiy must equal Uiy,ky for some 1 ≤ ky ≤ piy . The last step in our algorithm
(that computes c∗) tries to find such a ky that has the minimum cost Q[iy,ky], and the total cost c∗ of H is
∑miy Q[iy,ky] where the sum is over all children of mi in the tree T (the trees rooted at miy are disjoint, so the
optimal cost c∗ is sum of those costs). This proves Theorem 4 for tree workflows
Q[ j, ℓ] stores correct values. The following lemma shows that the algorithm stores correct values in
Q[ j, ℓ] for all public modules m j in the closure C.
Lemma 6. For 1 ≤ j ≤ k, let Tj be the subtree rooted at m j and let Att j = ⋃mq∈Tj Aq. The entry Q[ j, ℓ],
1≤ ℓ≤ p j, stores the minimum cost of the hidden attributes H jℓ ⊆ Att j such that A j∩H jℓ =U jℓ, and every
module mq ∈ Tj, is UD-safe with respect to Aq∩H jℓ.
To complete the proof of Theorem 4 for tree workflows, we need to prove Lemma 6, that we prove next.
Proof. We prove the lemma by an induction on all nodes at depth h = H down to 1 of the tree T , where
depth H contains all leaf nodes and depth 1 contains the children of the root mi (which is at depth 0).
First consider any leaf node m j at height H . Then Tj contains only m j and Att j = A j. For any 1 ≤
ℓ ≤ p j, since Att j = A j ⊇ H jℓ and A j ∩H jℓ = U j,ℓ. In this case H jℓ is unique and Q[ j, ℓ] correctly stores
c(U j,ℓ) = c(H jℓ).
Suppose the induction holds for all nodes up to height h+ 1, and consider a node m j at height h. Let
mi1 , · · · ,mix be the children of m j which are at height h+ 1. Let H jℓ be the min-cost solution, which is
partitioned into two disjoint component:
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Figure 7: Reduction from 3SAT. White modules are public, Grey are private. Red thin edges denote TRUE
assignment, Blue bold edges denote FALSE assignment.
c(H jℓ) = c(H jℓ∩ I j)+ c(H jℓ \ I j)
First we argue that c(H jℓ∩ I j) = c(U j,ℓ). A j ∩H jℓ =U jℓ. Then I j ∩U jℓ = I j ∩A j∩H jℓ = I j ∩H jℓ, since
I j ⊆ A j. Hence c(I j ∩H jℓ) = c(I j ∩U jℓ). This accounts for the cost of the first part of Q[ j, ℓ].
Next we analyze the cost c(H jℓ \ I j). This cost comes from the subtrees Ti1 , · · · ,Tix which are disjoint
due to the tree structure and absence of data-sharing. Let us partition the subset H jℓ \ I j into disjoint parts
(H jℓ \ I j)∩ Attiy , 1 ≤ y ≤ x. Below we prove that c((H jℓ \ I j)∩ Attiy) = Q[iy,ky], 1 ≤ y ≤ x, where ky is
computed as in the algorithm. This will complete the proof of the lemma.
To see this, let H ′ = (H jℓ \ I j)∩ Attiy . Clearly, Attiy ⊇ H ′. Every mq ∈ Tj is UD-safe with respect
to Aq∩H jℓ. If also mq ∈ Tiy , then Aq∩H ′ = Aq ∩H jℓ, and therefore all mq ∈ Tiy are also UD-safe with
respect to H ′. In particular, miy is UD-safe with respect to H ′, and therefore Aiy ∩H ′ =Uiy,ky for some ky,
since Uiy,ky was chosen as the UD-safe set by our algorithm.
Finally we argue that c(H ′) = c(H iy,ky), where H iy,ky is the min-cost solution for miy among all such
subsets. This follows from our induction hypothesis, since miy is a node at depth h+1. Therefore, c(H ′) =
c(H iy,ky) = Q[iy,ky], i.e.
c((H jℓ \ I j)∩Attiy) = Q[iy,ky]
as desired. This proves the lemma.
B.4 Proof of NP-hardness for DAG Workflows
Here we prove NP-hardness for arbitrary DAG workflows as stated in Theorem 4 by a reduction from 3SAT.
Given a CNF formula ψ on n variables z1, · · · ,zn and m clauses ψ1, · · · ,ψm, we construct a graph as
shown in Figure 7. Let variable zi occurs in mi different clauses (as positive or negative literals). In the
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figure, the module p0 is the single-private module (mi), having a single output attribute a. The rest of the
modules are the public modules in the public-closure C({a}).
For every variable zi, we create mi + 2 nodes: pi,yi and xi,1, · · · ,xi,mi . For every clause ψ j, we create 2
modules C j and f j.
The edge connections are as follows:
1. p0 sends its single output a to p1.
2. For every i = 1 to n−1, pi has two outputs; one is sent to pi+1 and the other is sent to yi. pn sends its
single output to yn.
3. Each yi, i = 1 to n, sends two outputs to xi,1. The blue outgoing edge from yi denotes positive assign-
ment of the variable zi, whereas the red edge denotes negative assignment of the variable zi.
4. Each xi, j, i = 1 to n, j = 1 to mi − 1, sends two outputs (blue and red) to xi, j+1. In addition, if xi, j,
i = 1 to n, j = 1 to mi sends a blue (resp. red) edge to clause node Ck if the variable zi is a positive
(resp. negative) in the clause Ck (and Ck is the j-th such clause containing zi).
5. Each C j, j = 1 to m, sends its single output to f j.
6. Each f j, j = 1 to m−1, sends its single output to f j+1, fm outputs the single final output.
The UD-safe sets are defined as follows:
1. For every i = 1 to n−1, pi has a single UD-safe set: hide all its inputs and outputs.
2. Each yi, i = 1 to n, has three UD-safe choices: (1) hide its unique input and blue output, (2) hide its
unique input and red output, (3) hide its single input and both blue and red outputs.
3. Each xi, j , i = 1 to n, j = 1 to mi, has three choices: (1) hide blue input and all blue outputs, (2) hide
red input and all red outputs, (3) hide all inputs and all outputs.
4. Each C j, j = 1 to m, has choices: hide the single output and at least of the three inputs.
5. Each f j, j = 1 to m, has the single choice: hide all its inputs and outputs.
Cost. The outputs from yi, i = 1 to n has unit cost, the cost of the other attributes is 0. The following
lemma proves correctness of the construction.
Lemma 7. There is a solution of single-module problem of cost = n if and only if the 3SAT formula ψ is
satisfiable.
Proof. (if) Suppose the 3SAT formula is satisfiable, so there is an assignment of the variables zi that makes
Ψ true. If zi is set to TRUE (resp FALSE), choose the blue (resp. red) outgoing edge from yi. Then choose
the other edges accordingly: (1) choose outgoing edge from p0, (2) choose all input and outputs of pi, i = 1
to n; (3) if blue (resp. red) input of xi, j is chosen, all its blue (resp. red) outputs are chosen; and, (4) all
inputs and outputs of f j are chosen. Clearly, all these are UD-safe sets by construction.
So we have to only argue about the clause nodes C j. Since ψ is satisfied by the given assignment, there
is a literal zi ∈C j (positive or negative), whose assignment makes it true. Hence at least one of the inputs to
C j will be chosen. So the UD-safe requirements of all the UD-safe clauses are satisfied. The total cost
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of the solution is n since exactly one output of the yi nodes, i = 1 to n, have been chosen.
(only if) Suppose there is a solution to the single-module problem of cost n. Then each yi can choose ex-
actly one output (at least one output has to be chosen to satisfy UD-safe property for each yi, and more than
one output cannot be chosen as the cost is n). If yi chooses blue (resp. red) output, this forces the xi, j nodes
to select the corresponding blue (resp. red) inputs and outputs. No xi, j can choose the UD-safe option of
selecting all its inputs and outputs as in that case finally yi be forced to select both outputs which will exceed
the cost. Since C j satisfies UD-safe condition, this in turn forces each C j to select the corresponding blue
(resp. red) inputs.
If the blue (resp. red) output of yi is chosen, the variable is set to TRUE (resp. FALSE). By the above ar-
gument, at least one such red or blue input will be chosen as input to each C j, that satisfies the corresponding
clause ψ j.
C General Workflows
In this section we discuss the privacy theorem for general workflows as outlined in Section 5. First we define
directed-path and downward-closure as follows (similar to public path and public-closure).
Definition 12. A module m1 has a directed path to another module m2, if there are modules mi1 ,mi2 , · · · ,mi j
such that mi1 = m1, mi j = m2, and for all 1 ≤ k < j, Oik ∩ Iik+1 6= /0.
An attribute a ∈ A has a directed path from to module m j, if there is a module mk such that a ∈ Ik and
mk has a directed path to m j.
Definition 13. Given a private module mi and a set of hidden output attributes hi ⊆Oi of mi, the downward-
closure of mi with respect to hi, denoted by D(hi), is the set of modules m j (both private and public) such
that there is a directed path from some attribute a ∈ hi to m j.
Also recall downstream-safety (D-safety) defined in Definition 8 which says that for equivalent inputs
to a module with respect to hidden attributes, the outputs must be equivalent. We prove the following theo-
rem in this section:
Theorem 5. (Privacy Theorem for General workflows) Let W be any workflow. For each private module
mi in W, let Hi be a subset of hidden attributes such that (i) hi = Hi∩Oi is safe for Γ-standalone-privacy
of mi, (ii) each private and public module m j in the downward-closure D(hi) is D-safe with respect
to A j ∩Hi, and (iii) Hi ⊆ Oi ∪
⋃
j:m j∈D(hi) A j. Then the workflow W is Γ-private with respect to H =⋃
i:mi is private Hi.
In the proof of Theorem 2 from Lemma 1, we used the fact that for single-predecessor workflows, for
two distinct private modules mi,mk, the public-closures and the hidden subsets Hi,H j are disjoint. However,
it is not hard to see that this is not the case for general workflows, where the downward-closure and the
subsets Hi may overlap. Further, the D-safe property is not monotone (hiding more output attributes will
maintain the D-safe property, but hiding more input attributes may destroy the D-safe property). So we
need to argue that the D-safe property is maintained when we take union of Hi sets in the workflow which
is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 8. If a module m j is D-safe with respect to sets H1,H2 ⊆ A j, then m j is D-safe with respect
to H = H1∪H2.
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Given two equivalent inputs x1 ≡H x2 with respect to H =H1∪H2, we have to show that their outputs are
equivalent: m j(x1) ≡H m j(x2). Even if x1,x2 are equivalent with respect to H , they may not be equivalent
with respect to H1 or H2. In the proof we construct a new tuple x3 such that x1 ≡H1 x3, and x2 ≡H2 x3. Then
using the D-safe properties of H1 and H2, we show that m j(x1)≡H m j(x3)≡V m j(x2). The formal proof
is given below.
Proof. Let H = H1∪H2. Let x1 and x2 be two input tuples to m j such that x1 ≡H x2. i.e.
ΠI j\H(x1) = ΠI j\H(x2) (13)
For a ∈ I j, let x3[a] denote the value of a-th attribute of x3 (similarly x1[a],x2[a]). From (13), for a ∈ I j \H ,
x1[a] = x2[a]. Let us define a tuple x3 as follows on four disjoint subsets of I j:
x3[a] = x1[a] if a ∈ I j ∩H1∩H2
= x1[a] if a ∈ I j ∩ (H2 \H1)
= x2[a] if a ∈ I j ∩ (H1 \H2)
= x1[a] = x2[a] if a ∈ I j \H
For instance, on attribute set I j = 〈a1, · · · ,a5〉, let x1 = 〈2,3,2,6,7〉, x2 = 〈4,5,9,6,7〉, H1 = {a1,a2}
and H2 = {a2,a3}, H = {a1,a2,a3} (in x1,x2, the hidden attribute values in H are underlined). Then
x3 = 〈4,3,2,6,7〉.
(1) First we claim that, x1 ≡H1 x3, or,
ΠI j\H1(x1) = ΠI j\Hi(x3) (14)
Partition I j \H1 into two disjoint subsets, I j ∩ (H2 \H1), and, I j \ (H1∪H2) = I j \H . From the definition of
x3, for all a ∈ I j ∩ (H2 \H1) and all a ∈ I j \H , x1[a] = x3[a]. This shows (14).
(2) Next we claim that, x2 ≡H2 x3, or,
ΠI j\H2(x2) = ΠI j\H2(x3) (15)
Again partition I j \H2 into two disjoint subsets, I j∩ (H1 \H2), and, I j \ (H1∪H2) = I j \H . From the defini-
tion of x3, for all a ∈ I j ∩ (H1 \H2) and all a ∈ I j \H , x2[a] = x3[a]. This shows (15). (14) and (15) can also
be verified from the above example.
(3) Now by the condition stated in the lemma, m j is D-safe with respect to H1 and H2. Therefore,
using (14) and (15), m j(x1)≡H1 m j(x3) and m j(x2)≡H2 m j(x3) or,
ΠO j\H1(m j(x1)) = ΠO j\H1(m j(x3)) (16)
and
ΠO j\H2(m j(x2)) = ΠO j\H2(m j(x3)) (17)
Since O j \H = O j \ (H1∪H2) ⊆ O j \H1, from (16)
ΠO j\H(m j(x1)) = ΠO j\H(m j(x3)) (18)
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Similarly, O j \H ⊆ O j \H2, from (17)
ΠO j\H(m j(x2)) = ΠO j\H(m j(x3)) (19)
From (18) and (19),
ΠO j\H(m j(x1)) = ΠO j\H(m j(x2)) (20)
In other words, the output tuples m j(x1),m j(x2), that are defined on attribute set O j,
m j(x1)≡H m j(x2) (21)
Since we started with two arbitrary input tuples x1 ≡V x2, this shows that for all equivalent input tuples the
outputs are also equivalent. In other words, m j is D-safe with respect to H = H1∪H2.
Along with this lemma, two other simple observations will be useful.
Observation 3. 1. Any module m j is D-safe with respect to /0 (hiding nothing maintains downstream-
safety property).
2. If m j is D-safe with respect to H, and if H ′ is such that H ⊆H ′, but I j \H ′ = I j \H, then m j is also
D-safe with respect to H ′ (hiding more output attributes maintains downstream-safety property).
C.1 Main Lemma for Privacy Theorem for General Workflows
The following lemma is the crucial component in the proof of Theorem5, and is analogous to Lemma 1 for
single-predecessor workflows.
Lemma 9. Consider a standalone private module mi, a set of hidden attributes hi, any input x to mi, and
any candidate output y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi of x. Then y ∈ OUTx,W,Hi when mi belongs to an arbitrary (general)
workflow W, and a set attributes Hi ⊆ A is hidden such that (i) hi ⊆ Hi, (ii) only output attributes from Oi
are included in hi (i.e. hi ⊆ Oi), and (iii) every module m j in the downward-closure D(hi) is D-safe with
respect to A j ∩Hi.
Proof. We fix a module mi, an input x to mi, a set of safe hidden attributes hi, and a candidate output
y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi for x. For simplicity, let us refer to the set of modules in D(hi) by D. We will show that
y ∈ OUTx,W,Hi where the hidden attributes Hi satisfies the conditions in the lemma. In the proof, we show
the existence of a possible world R′ ∈ Worlds(R,Hi), such that if ΠIi(t) = x for some t∈R′, then ΠOi(t) = y.
Since y ∈ OUTx,mi,hi , by Lemma 3, y ≡hi z where z = mi(x).
We will use the FLIP function used in the proof of Lemma 1 (see Appendix A.2). We redefine the
module mi to m̂i as follows. For an input u to mi, m̂i(u) = FLIPy,z(mi(u)). All other public and private
modules are unchanged, m̂ j = m j. The required possible world R′ is obtained by taking the join of the
standalone relations of these m̂ j-s, j ∈ [n].
First note that by the definition of m̂i, m̂i(x) = y (since m̂i(x) = FLIPy,z(mi(x)) = FLIPy,z(z) = y, from
Observation 1). Hence if ΠIi(t) = x for some t ∈ R′, then ΠOi(t) = y.
Next we argue that R′ ∈ Worlds(R,Hi). Since R′ is the join of the standalone relations for modules m̂ j-s,
R′ maintains all functional dependencies I j → O j. Also none of the public modules are unchanged, hence
for any public module m j and any tuple t in R′, ΠO j(t) = m j(ΠI j(t)). So we only need to show that the
projection of R and R′ on the visible attributes are the same.
Let us assume, wlog. that the modules are numbered in topologically sorted order. Let I0 be the initial
input attributes to the workflow, and let p be a tuple defined on I0. There are two unique tuples t ∈ R and
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t′ ∈ R′ such that ΠI1(t) = ΠI1(t′) = p. Note that any intermediate or final attribute a ∈ A\ I0 belongs to O j,
for a unique j ∈ [1,n] (since for j 6= ℓ, O j ∩Oℓ = φ ). So it suffices to show that t, t ′ projected on O j are
equivalent with respect to visible attributes for all module j, j = 1 to n.
Let c j,m,c j,m̂ be the values of input attributes I j and d j,m,d j,m̂ be the values of output attributes O j of
module m j, in t ∈ R and t′ ∈ R′ respectively on initial input attributes p (i.e. c j,m = ΠI j(t), c j,m̂ = ΠI j(t′),
d j,m = ΠO j(t) and d j,m̂ = ΠO j(t′)). We prove by induction on j = 1 to n that
d j,m̂ ≡Hi d j,m if j = i or m j ∈ D (22)
d j,m̂ = d j,m otherwise (23)
If the above is true for all j, then ΠO j(t) ≡Hi ΠO j(t), along with the fact that the initial inputs p are the
same, this implies that t≡Hi t′.
Proof of (22) and (23). The base case follows for j = 1. If m1 6= mi (m j can be public or private),
then I1 ∩Oi = /0, so for all input u, m̂ j(u) = m j(FLIPy,z(u)) = m j(u). Since the inputs c1,m̂ = c1,m (both
projections of initial input p on I1), the outputs d1,m̂ = d1,m. This shows (23). If m1 = mi, the inputs are the
same, and by definition of m̂1, d1,m̂ = m̂1(c1,m̂) = FLIPy,z(mi(c1,m̂)) = FLIPy,z(mi(c1,m)) = FLIPy,z(d1,m).
Since y,z only differ in the hidden attributes, by the definition of the FLIP function d1,m̂ ≡Hi d1,m. This
shows (22). Note that the module m1 cannot belong to D since then it will have predecessor mi and cannot
be the first module in topological order.
Suppose the hypothesis holds until j−1, consider m j. There will be three cases to consider.
(i) If j = i, for all predecessors mk of mi (Ok ∩ Ii 6= /0), k 6= i and mk /∈ D, since the workflow is a
DAG. Therefore from (23), using the induction hypothesis, ci,m̂ = ci,m. Hence di,m̂ = m̂i(ci,m̂) =
FLIPy,z(mi(ci,m̂)) = FLIPy,z(mi(ci,m)) = FLIPy,z(di,m). Again, y,z are equivalent with respect to Hi,
so di,m̂ ≡Hi di,m. This shows (22) in the inductive step.
(ii) If j 6= i (m̂ j = m j) and m j /∈ D, then m j does not get any of its inputs from any module in D, or
any hidden attributes from mi (then by the definition of D, m j ∈ D). Using IH, from (23) and from
(22), using the fact that y,z are equivalent on visible attributes, c j,m̂ = c j,m. Then d j,m̂ = m j(c j,m̂) =
m j(c j,m) = d j,m. This shows (23) in the inductive step.
(iii) If j 6= i, but m j ∈ D, m j can get all its inputs either from mi, from other modules in D, or from
modules not in D. Using the IH from (22) and (23), c j,m̂ ≡Hi c j,m. Since m j ∈ D, by the condition of
the lemma, m j is D-safe with respect to Hi. Therefore the corresponding outputs d j,m̂ = m j(c j,m̂)
and d j,m = m j(c j,m) are equivalent, or d j,m̂ ≡Hi d j,m. This again shows (22) in the inductive step.
Hence the IH holds for all j = 1 to n and this completes the proof of the lemma.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Finally, we prove Theorem 5 using Lemmas 8 and 9.
of Theorem 5. We argue that if Hi satisfies the conditions in Theorem 5, then H ′i =
⋃
i:mi is private Hi satisfies
the conditions in Lemma 9. The first two conditions are easily satisfied by H ′i : (i) hi ⊆ Hi ⊆ H ′i and (ii)
hi ⊆ Oi. So we need to show (iii), i.e. all modules in the downward-closure D(hi) are D-safe with respect
to A j ∩H ′i .
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From the conditions in the theorem, each module m j ∈ D(hi) is D-safe with respect to A j ∩Hi. We
show that for any other private module mk 6= mi, m j is also D-safe with respect to A j∩Hk. There may be
three such cases as discussed below.
Case-I: If m j ∈ D(hk), by the D-safety conditions in the theorem, m j is D-safe with respect
to A j ∩Hk.
Case-II: If m j /∈ D(hk) and m j 6= mk, for any private module mk 6= mi, A j ∩Hk = /0 (since Hk ⊆
Ok∪
⋃
ℓ∈D(hk) Aℓ from the theorem). From Observation 3, m j is D-safe with respect to A j∩Hk.
Case-III: If m j /∈D(hk) but m j = mk (or j = k), then Hk∩A j ⊆ O j (again since Hk ⊆ Ok∪⋃ℓ∈D(hk) Aℓ
and Ok = O j). From Observation 3, m j is D-safe with respect to /0, and A j∩Hk ⊇ /0. Further, I j \ /0 = I j =
I j \ (A j ∩Hk). This is because Hk ∩A j ⊆ O j, since O j ∩ I j = /0, I j ∩ (A j ∩Hk) = /0. Hence from the same
observation, m j is D-safe with respect to A j ∩Hk.
Hence m j is D-safewith respect to A j∩Hi and for all private modules mk, mk 6=mi, m j is D-safewith
respect to A j∩Hk. By Lemma 8, then m j is D-safe with respect to (A j∩Hi)∪ (A j∩Hk) = A j∩ (Hi∪Hk).
By a simple induction on all private modules mk, m j is D-safe with respect to A j ∩ (
⋃
k:mk is private)Hk =
A j ∩H ′i . Hence H ′i satisfies the conditions stated in the lemma. The rest of the proof follows by the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.
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